A Natural History of Human Thinking by Michael Tomasello

A Natural History of Human Thinking by Michael Tomasello

Author:Michael Tomasello [Tomasello, Michael]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: Non-Fiction, Science
ISBN: 978-0-674-72477-8
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 2014-02-16T16:00:00+00:00


Institutional Reality

In the limit, some conventional cultural practices turn into full-blown institutions. Obviously, the dividing line is fuzzy, but a basic prerequisite is that the cultural practice is not a solo activity but is in some sense collaborative, with well-defined, complementary roles. But the key feature distinguishing cultural institutions is that they comprise social norms that do not just regulate existing activities but, rather, create new cultural entities (the norms are not regulative but constitutive). For example, a human group might tend to make decisions about such things as where to travel next, how to set up defenses against potential predators, and so forth, by simply arguing among themselves. But if there are difficulties in making decisions, or infighting among several coalitions, then the group could institutionalize the process into some kind of governing council. Creating this council would give otherwise normal individuals abnormal status and powers. The council might then designate a chief, whom they would empower to do still other abnormal things, like banish people from the group. The council and chief are thus cultural creations, and their entitlements and obligations are bestowed upon them by the members of the group, who can, in theory, take them away and so turn the council members and chief back into everyday people again. The roles in institutions are explicitly agent neutral because, in theory if not in practice, anyone may play any role.

Searle (1995) has been most explicit about how this process works. First, obviously, is some kind of mutual agreement or joint acceptance among group members to designate, for example, an individual as chief. Second, there must be some kind of symbolizing capacity so as to enact Searle’s well-known formula “X counts as Y in context C” (X counts as chief in the context of group decision making). Related to this, there should be some actual physical symbol—something like a leader’s headdress or scepter or presidential seal—to help in marking the new status in a public way. The fact that institutions are public means that everyone knows that everyone knows about them and cannot plead ignorance in the face of overt symbolic marking. This is one reason why new institutions and officials are anointed with their new obligations and entitlements not just implicitly but explicitly and publicly. One could not do something bad to a chief wearing his official headdress, right after his official inauguration, and then plead ignorance of his status. Similarly with formally written rules and laws: their public nature essentially means that one cannot break them and expect to be excused by pleading ignorance.

Rakoczy and Tomasello (2007) argue that a simple model for understanding cultural institutions is rule games. Of course one may move a piece of wood shaped like a horse all around a checkered board in any way one likes. But if one wants to play chess, then one acknowledges that this horse-shaped piece is a “knight,” and one moves a knight only in certain ways, and the other pieces in other ways, toward



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