US Fast Battleships 1938–91 by Lawrence Burr

Author:Lawrence Burr
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: US Fast Battleships 1938––91: The Iowa class
ISBN: 9781780962726
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Published: 2011-11-24T16:00:00+00:00

Part of the magazine with powder charges in their storage containers. (Author’s collection)

In this uneven battle, Taffy 3 lost one escort carrier, Gambier Bay, two destroyers, Johnston and Hoel, and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts. The escort carrier St. Lo was hit after the battle by a kamikaze aircraft and also sank. However, the 5-inch guns of the escort carriers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and their torpedoes, plus aircraft attacks, all combined to sink the IJN cruisers Chokai, Chikuma, and Suzuya. At approximately 0911hrs Admiral Kurita ordered his forces to break off the action, cancelled the proposed move south to Leyte Gulf, and returned to the San Bernardino Strait.

Prior to and during the battle, messages from Kinkaid to Halsey had been held up in Manus. When they were finally received, Halsey ordered Task Force 38.1 with five carriers and four cruisers to aid Taffy 3. Aircraft from these carriers arrived at approximately 1316hrs to attack Kurita as he was steaming north for the San Bernardino Strait. A message from Admiral Nimitz to Halsey at 1000hrs, asking the whereabouts of Task Force 34 with the six fast battleships, prompted Halsey to order them south towards the San Bernardino Strait and Taffy 3. New Jersey and Iowa, using their greater speed, sailed ahead of Alabama, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Washington. New Jersey and Iowa arrived off the San Bernardino Strait three hours after Kurita and the battleships Yamato, Kongo, Haruna, and Nagato had entered the Strait on their return to Brunei. The “decisive” battleship battle was not to be.

Admiral Halsey has been criticized for leaving the San Bernardino Strait uncovered and thereby putting Taffy 3 and the invasion force in Leyte Gulf at risk. Admiral Kinkaid has also been criticized for not deploying search aircraft north from Leyte Gulf to the San Bernardino Strait and thereby being surprised by Kurita. These arguments have complex backgrounds founded in the decision to have a split naval command and in not allowing Fleet commanders to communicate directly.

Despite the focus on the San Bernardino Strait being left without cover, Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet Task Force 38.3 and 38.4 continued north, and attacked Admiral Ozawa’s force on October 25 in the battle of Cape Engano, sinking all four carriers. This was the greatest number of IJN carriers sunk in one day, greater than that at the battle of Midway in June 1942. This left the IJN with only seven carriers remaining in commission, two of which were only used for ferrying aircraft, one that had no aircraft, and two that never sailed. Taken together, the battle of the Philippine Sea destroyed the IJN carrier aircrews, while the battle of Cape Engano destroyed the last of the IJN carriers capable of combat operations. Additionally, the Musashi and two other IJN battleships had been sunk.

The need to counter the Kongo class had been a major determining factor for the General Board of the US Navy to build ten fast battleships of the North Carolina, South Dakota, and Iowa classes.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.