Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle's Rhetoric by Elyazghi Ezzaher Lahcen; Ezzaher Lahcen Elyazghi;

Author:Elyazghi Ezzaher, Lahcen; Ezzaher, Lahcen Elyazghi;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Southern Illinois University Press

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1.4.1. The first thing we must consider with regard to matters about which we deliberate is, what is the good that we give counsel about? Deliberation is, in effect, not about everything good, but in the good things that may or may not be. As to the good the production or nonproduction of which is by necessity, there is no deliberation about it. Nor is there deliberation about all the possible good things, since herein are good things that possibly exist by nature, but there is [deliberation] about possible good things the production or nonproduction of which depends on us—they are the things the principle of the production of which is by choice and will—and among these things are the things whose existence or non-existence depends on our deliberate reflection and actions at the most. As to the things that come from deliberate reflection by chance and on a few occasions, they do not in most cases belong to the scope of deliberation, except when the other kind [of oratory] does not possibly exist. What indicates that counsel is indeed achieved by these things is that the person examines, first, if the thing he wants to do is possible or impossible. Then if such action is possible, he should consider the means by which it is possible and the manner in which it is possible. Once that becomes clear to him, he will proceed to work on it. But if it becomes clear to him that such action is not possible, he will abandon it. The things about which we give counsel are the things about which we deliberate.

1.4.2. What we have said evidently shows the good that we recommend and in what things it can happen, and these are the voluntary things the existence of which depends on us; they are not the necessary things the existence of which does not depend on us.

1.4.3. As to giving a complete account of the difference between voluntary and involuntary things and providing an exact enumeration of their types and the knowledge of the essence of each one of them, to the utmost degree of what their nature allows us to know, that is not the object of this art [of rhetoric] to know voluntary things; rather, it is the object of the art of philosophy, which is superior to this art [of rhetoric] in the formulation of concepts and conviction, and the premises used in it are more truthful and more accurate than those used in this art [of rhetoric].17 In effect, here we are not concerned, in relation to the knowledge of these things, with the essential states relative to them, but with widely known matters.

1.4.4. Since such is the case, as we have described in these things, it is also evident from what we have said that everything we have said about the particulars of this art [of rhetoric] is true; I mean that it is composed of the science of logic and the science of ethical politics, and

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