The Turkish War of Independence: a Military History, 1919-1923 by Erickson Edward J.;

Author:Erickson, Edward J.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: ABC-CLIO, LLC
Published: 2021-04-27T16:00:00+00:00

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL RESET

The Concise Greek History asserted, “The operations of March 1921 not only failed to provide a Greek solution to the Asia Minor problem, but acted adversely to the Greek cause.”32 In its reports to the General Staff and the ministry of war, the FAAM noted that the Nationalists were cheered by their victories, but, more importantly, the Nationalist Army had made significant progress in composition and organization. Moreover, the FAAM warned the government that reinforcements were urgently needed if major operations were to continue. On April 28, 1921, newly sworn in prime minister Demetrios Gounares arrived in Izmir for briefings. The staff told him that the Nationalists had 88,000 men with 250 artillery pieces and 316 machine guns available but could only deploy 70,000 men and 200 artillery pieces against the FAAM, which could, in turn, deploy 100,000 men and 238 artillery pieces.33 This numerical superiority gave the Greeks sufficient forces to defeat the Nationalists. However, operationally the Greeks faced the problem of concentration because their forces were dispersed in two large groups (in Bursa and Uşak) separated by a mountain range, which made unified action difficult. Understanding the need for more forces, the Greeks detached the 11th Division from British control on May 18, as well as completed the mobilization started in March. The Nationalists enjoyed the reciprocal—what is called the central position—enabling them to concentrate or amass forces at will (in military doctrinal terms the Greeks were operating on exterior lines of communication, while the Nationalists operated on interior lines of communication). Mindful of these challenges, the Greek government decided to continue offensive operations with a view toward the destruction of the Nationalist Army, and King Constantine arrived in Smyrna on June 12, taking the role of nominal commander in chief of the FAAM.

On June 16, the commander of the FAAM, General Papoulas, his deputy chief of staff Colonel Ptolemaios Sarrigiannis (who had returned from London), met with King Constantine at his palace in Kordelio. Also present was the new chief of the Army Staff Service, Major General Victor Dousmanes, as well as the government liaison Major General Xenophon Strategos. Dousmanes and Strategos, together with Metaxas, had been part of the General Headquarters under then-Prince Constantine of the Greek field army in the Balkan Wars. Colonel Sarrigiannis presented the operational plan, which was agreeable to all present: encirclement from Army Corps C in the north meeting Army Corps A from the south near Kütahya, with Army Corps B making a frontal attack to fix the enemy in place while they were encircled. It was a classic maneuverist approach leading to a battle of annihilation, and it used the entire force. To bring their forces in Asia Minor up to strength, the government mobilized three classes of reserves on March 16, 1921 (1913b, 1914, and 1915) and, on April 28 mobilized four more classes of reserves (1903, 1904, 1912, 1913a)—altogether, some 58,000 men.34 The Greeks also conscripted 12,000 Ottoman Greeks living in the areas occupied by the FAAM in the 1910–1921 classes.

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