The Triumph of the Dark by Steiner Zara;

Author:Steiner, Zara;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA - OSO
Published: 2011-12-08T16:00:00+00:00

If the imbalance in the air was the most decisive strategic factor in dissuading the chiefs of staff from any attempt at deterrence, the widespread belief in German preparedness for war encouraged a general reluctance to consider fighting at the present time. As in Paris, the sheer scale of German rearmament so impressed the British that the numerous reports by the intelligence services of German weaknesses—i.e. the lack of raw materials and skilled labour, the operational shortcomings of the rapidly expanded army and air force, and the doubts of the German general staff about the country’s readiness for war—were down-graded. The fact that in five years Nazi Germany had created, almost from nothing, an army equivalent in numbers to that of the German army of 1914, dwarfed intelligence about Germany’s inability to mobilize and equip it to engage in a European war. British military intelligence correctly estimated in July 1938 that the German regular army would consist of 46 divisions. The number of first-line reserves and Landwehr divisions was considerably exaggerated, however, and during the course of the crisis these figures were further inflated, particularly the number of motorized and armoured divisions that Germany could put in the field. The assessments of the Air Ministry and War Office were reinforced by reports from the Industrial Intelligence Centre, a key contributor to the British intelligence assessment process, whose contacts reported that German industry was already operating in conditions of ‘partial mobilization’, and that state direction would circumvent any economic difficulties impeding the fulfilment of the government’s programmes. After the German test mobilization in August 1938, the War Office concluded that the Germans could launch ‘at will a sudden and overwhelming onslaught on Czechoslovakia without fear of effective interference from the West during this operation’.80 This warning was repeated twice during the first nine days of September. Neither information about the thin German couverture of the western frontier, nor about the numbers of the French and Czech forces, altered this assessment. Correctly enough, the War Office doubted whether the French would use their numerical superiority to launch an offensive, but it also dismissed encouraging reports from its own military attache in Prague about the Czech willingness and readiness to fight. Britain’s major task, it was agreed, was to win time for rearmament.

The prime minister’s own reading of the situation rested, not on the imbalance of military forces between Britain and Germany, but on his conviction that he could persuade Hitler to accept a peaceful solution to the Czech crisis, and agree to the wider proposals for co-operation Chamberlain had in mind. He had few doubts that he could succeed, and while he was indeed successful, he failed to grasp the full implications of his ‘success’, which produced results entirely different from those he had in mind.

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