The Korean War by Stueck William;

Author:Stueck, William;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Princeton University Press

PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS

On the eve of reaching agreement with the Communists on item 2, Ridgway told Washington that “our future bargaining potential” has been “substantially weakened.” “It is particularly debilitating to our prestige and negotiating position,” he complained, “to take firm positions, thereby creating widely publicized issues, only to withdraw from our position under pressure.” He urged his superiors to communicate to him final positions on the remaining issues and to give him authority to “ho ld firm…even to the point where the enemy breaks off negotiations.”49 In a meeting with the president on his return to Washington in mid-December, Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, formerly of the UNC delegation, emphasized the need for firmness and patience in dealing with the Communists. In the end, Burke concluded, battlefield events “had much more results at the conference table than anything said at the conference.”50

Ridgway and his subordinates underestimated their successes, failed to understand that their own overzealousness had been the source of embarrassment, not erratic signals from Washington, which had consistently cautioned against adopting rigid positions, and ignored the fact that the initial arrangements for talks had compromised UNC bargaining power on some matters. On the first point, UNC negotiators had worn down the Communists on numerous issues. The bulk of the line agreed to on 27 November was north of the 38th parallel and also mostly north of the battle line when talks had begun. The UNC had paid dearly in the blood of its soldiers for the advances, but the Communists had suffered much more. The fate of Kaesong represented an exception to the rule that battle field events had more influence in the negotiations than anything done at the conference table. Initial placement of the city in the neutral zone and UNC tolerance of its remaining there despite subsequent occupation by the enemy gave the latter a distinct advantage in claiming the city as its own. Yet, on balance, maneuvering by the Communists at the commencement of talks combined with their tactics of harassment to stiffen UNC resolve and encourage Ridgway to engage in military action that enhanced his side’s position. The overall strengthening of UNC lines of defense during the negotiations more than compensated for the loss of Kaesong.

Did the November concession on the armistice line weaken the UNC position in subsequent negotiations? Firm conclusions are impossible, but clearly the earlier UNC concession on the principle of compensation had not prevented the Communists from departing quickly thereafter from their insistence on the 38th parallel; nor had the subsequent UNC concession on setting an armistice line in advance of an actual cease-fire led the Communists to cling to their call for an end to the shooting before the remaining items on the agenda were resolved.51 This last UNC concession helped ward off growing dissension in the allied camp over the way the United States was conducting the talks, which was a matter of some importance.

Yet a crucial dimension of Ridgway’s argument was that the setting of an armistice line would make sustained military pressure on the enemy impossible.

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