The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan by Lester W. Grau

Author:Lester W. Grau [Grau, Lester W.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Russian army, Soviet Union, military history, counter-insurgency, Afghanistan, guerrilla warfare, Soviet-Afghan war
ISBN: 9781623580506
Publisher: Tales End Press
Published: 2012-06-24T04:00:00+00:00

Map 25: An airborne battalion in Islam-Dara Canyon.

At 1500 hours on 18 November, our first lift (forward group) was airborne. During our approach to the LZ, the enemy shot down four of our helicopters. Seven of our troopers were wounded as a result.

The surviving helicopters were unable to set down and returned to base. The first lift’s mission had to be fulfilled by a much smaller group of survivors on the ground. The air assault survivors came under enemy fire. Senior Lieutenant V. V. Serdyukov commanded the reconnaissance platoon, which was in a better situation. He led his men up the heights to seize hill 2300 and cover the withdrawal of the survivors. He hit the enemy on the flank, destroyed two firing points and captured hills 2300 and 2100. The recon platoon provided covering fire which enabled the survivors to withdraw into the pass and dig in on high ground.

On the morning of 19 November, air strikes and artillery fire rained down on the enemy firing points which reconnaissance had identified. Then, the rest of the battalion, followed by the regiment, landed at LZ #2. The first lift covered this insertion successfully. By 0800 on the 19th, the 2nd Airborne Company seized the heights which blocked the northern approach into the canyon. By 0400 on 20 November, the 3rd Airborne Company seized the dominant terrain along the west wall of the canyon. Two platoons of the 1st Airborne Company drove off the surviving enemy on hill 2400 and by 0630 hours on 19 November, they had occupied it. In this way, by 0400 hours on 20 November, the northern exit to the canyon was completely sealed. Consequently, the enemy had to try to withdraw to the southwest. By this time, other subunits of the division had captured the heights and sealed the canyon. They completed the destruction of the enemy.

Our battalion had no irrevocable losses. We had seven wounded – all from the first lift on the first day. We had three men badly bruised and shaken up from an accident with a BTR on the second day. Four Mi-8 helicopters were shot down. The enemy lost approximately 35 men KIA.

Frunze Commentary: The enemy concentrated the bulk of his combat power in the southern section of the canyon. We deceived him as to the location of the main strength of the Soviet force which led to his defeat. Attention must be paid to the well-organized air defenses which the enemy fielded. His air defense firing points were interconnected and well-protected. They proved to be safe from artillery fire and airstrikes. Because we did not have any intelligence data on the location of the enemy air defense weapons, our supporting helicopter gunships indiscriminately shot up the mountain tops, but the machine guns which downed the lift ships were located at the base of the mountains.

After examining the mistakes, we can draw the following positive experience from this operation: The success of the entire operation depended, to a great deal, on the courageous and decisive actions of the first lift.

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