Talavera: Wellington's First Victory in Spain by Andrew Field

Author:Andrew Field [Field, Andrew]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Modern Warfare, Napoleonic Wars, Battles, Campaigns
ISBN: 1844152685
Amazon: 1844152685
Publisher: Pen & Sword
Published: 2006-06-15T04:00:00+00:00

The First Attack

Alexander the Great’s favourite battlefield tactic was to attack the most strongly held point of his enemy’s line, as he reasoned that this was where their commander most feared an attack. Therefore, if he was to prevail by concentrating all his combat power on this single point he would win the battle without heavy fighting and casualties elsewhere. In a decision reminiscent of Alexander, Victor again planned to attack the strongest point of the British line, the Cerro de Medellin. The difficulties of attacking the hill, up a steep, rocky slope and on a relatively narrow front, were obvious, but it remained the key to Wellesley’s line and thus ‘the grand object of their desire’.3 He who remained in control of the Medellin would probably win the battle, and so Victor was seduced into an unsophisticated frontal assault on this vital ground.

No thought was given to manoeuvring the British off the heights. Although Jourdan was opposed to an attack as he thought the Medellin was ‘impregnable to a frontal attack’,4 he made clear in his memoirs that after the failure of the night attack the army should have formed up in the valley to the north of the British position, which was then unoccupied by any allied troops, and the Medellin should have been attacked from that direction at daybreak. This would have approached the hill from a less difficult direction and threatened the exposed flank of the British left. The assault would have been supported by a deception attack on the shaky Spanish army to the south. This plan offered the possibility of securing the hill without risking what would inevitably be heavy casualties. It is quite possible that Victor may have supported such a move in other circumstances, but he was still to fully appreciate the capabilities of the British army; after all, their performance in the previous twenty-four hours had been less than inspiring.

Victor’s plan was to launch a diversionary attack with Lapisse’s division, supported by Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry, on the lower, southern slopes of the Medellin, while Ruffin delivered the main attack on the heights. Villatte’s division would provide the reserve. Ruffin deployed his men with the 24ème de ligne on the left, so that they faced Tilson’s brigade, and the 9ème légère on the right opposite Stewart’s. The 96ème de ligne remained in reserve.5 In this encounter the French would have an advantage in numbers of about 1,000: 4,900 Frenchmen against 3,700 British.

Oman states that the attack was made in three large regimental columns, but this is unlikely. Usual French practice would have had them in individual battalion columns, and Fortescue states, ‘We know for certain that each battalion was in close column of double companies’,6 although he does not give his source. The Earl of Munster has them in this formation,7 and the regimental history of the Buffs has them in ‘nine ranks’,8 suggesting the same. The only possible advantage of regimental columns was if the advance was restricted to a narrow frontage or in the hope of intimidating the opposition by conveying an image of irresistible force.

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