Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War by Henschke Adam Evans Nicholas G. Allhoff Fritz

Author:Henschke, Adam,Evans, Nicholas G.,Allhoff, Fritz.
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781136260995
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd

4. Spatial exceptionalism

As mentioned in Section 2, exceptionalism could also occur along some spatial axis: remember our friends from Montana who cannot receive wine directly from California wineries. So here we have some norm which applies to everyone except those who occupy some particularly delimited space. And this suggests the generalized conception of spatial exceptionalism: “All Xs can/cannot/must Ф, except those who are in S (where S is some location).” Unlike temporal exceptionalism, there is undoubtedly a lot of spatial exceptionalism: every time local norms deviate from some more widely held norms, spatial exceptionalism exists. Something would have to be said about how to individuate locations, particularly nested ones, but we shall not pursue that here. For this project, though, the question is whether the war on terrorism gives rise to spatial exceptionalism. And I do not think that it does, at least not in the relevant sense. Before seeing the argument for that, let us consider Marks, who argues for the contrary.

Marks points to enemy combatancy status, which was discussed in Section 1; we can therefore skip the details of that status. Let me say from the outset that this is probably the most plausible example of spatial exceptionalism in the war on terror and that, if it does not withstand scrutiny, then it is unlikely that spatial exceptionalism is significant in this regard. Marks writes of “spatial or geographic exceptionalism, in which physical locality is relied upon to justify the non-application of protective norms and procedures. A good example of this is Guantánamo, selected by the administration in an effort to keep detainees beyond the habeas corpus jurisdiction of federal courts.”53,54 Marks thinks that this is an example of spatial exceptionalism on the grounds that certain norms (do not) apply, based on location. The norm, then, could be something like: “All those held in US custody have the right to habeas corpus, except those held at Guantánamo (and, perhaps, some other places).”

I do not disagree that this statement is true, nor do I disagree that the Bush Administration specifically chose Cuba precisely because they could assign such status to the detainees held there. But this does not seem like an example of spatial exceptionalism, at least once we look at it more closely. Return to the case of the Montanan who cannot directly order Californian wine. In that case, there is nothing about the Montanan himself that does any of the motivating work for the legislation. If the Montanan moves south to Wyoming, he can order wine, and this would be of vanishingly little interest to the Montanan legislature. Their law is precisely designed to govern a space, irrespective of whoever occupies that space. If all of the residents of Montana and Wyoming traded states, the legislation would continue unaffected. This is therefore a perfect example of spatial exceptionalism.

Contrast that case with Guantánamo. The practices at Guantánamo are not motivated by the space over which they are operative, but rather by the people who occupy that space (namely, the detainees).

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