Rhetoric by Aristotle; Reeve C. D. C.;

Author:Aristotle; Reeve, C. D. C.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Hackett Publishing Company, Incorporated
Published: 2018-08-02T00:00:00+00:00

Book II

Note 413

Premises useful in relation to the means of persuasion belonging to these: That is, to the three kinds of oratory or speeches (deliberative, epideictic, and judicial) whose goals (exhort, dissuade; praise, blame; accuse, defend) have just been listed.

Note 414

Enthymemes special to (one might almost say) each kind of speech are concerned with these and composed of (ek) these: The preposition ek can (among other things) mean either “composed of” or “on the basis of.” Enthymemes are composed of propositions and based on topics which are represented by these propositions. See Introduction, pp. lxv–lxxvii.

Note 415

A trial (dikê) is a judgment (krisis): Compare: “Dikê is a krisis of what is just and what is unjust” (NE V 10 1134a31–32); “Dikê is a krisis of what is just” (Pol. I 2 1253a38–39).

It is necessary for the speaker to look . . . also to himself, that he be of a certain quality, and to the judge, to produce a certain quality in him too: See I 3 1358b1–4.

Note 416

To those who love (philousi) and those who hate (misousin): Discussed in II 4.

Note 417

To the one who feels none (apathêi) and is disgusted (duscherainonti): Reading τῷ δ’ ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι with Kassel and Grimaldi for OCT τῷ δ’ ἀπαθεῖ <ἢ> καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι (“the one who feels nothing or is even disgusted”). I take τῷ δ’ ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι to contrast with τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι in the previous clause, and so understand apathêi as having a more focused meaning than the usual one. That way there is no conflict between apathêi and duscherainonti.

Note 418

Speakers are deceptive (diapseudontai) in what they say or advise due to all of these or due to one of them (toutôn ti): In the case of a failure of practical wisdom the deception may be unintentional, since the false beliefs the speakers express {250} may be genuinely their own. But in the other cases, the deception must clearly be intentional. See next note.

Note 419

For either it is due to a lack of practical wisdom that they do not form beliefs correctly; or, though forming beliefs correctly, it is due to depravity that they do not say what seems to be so to them; or they are practically-wise and decent people, but not people of goodwill, so that it is possible for them not to give the best advice though they know it: On Aristotle’s own view, practical wisdom and virtue of character, when properly understood, must always go together: “It is neither possible to be fully good without practical wisdom nor practically-wise without virtue of character” (NE VI 13 1144b31–32). He may, in fact, be presupposing this when he writes that “speakers are deceptive in what they say or advise due to all of these or due to one of them.” Moreover, goodwill too is at least generally connected to these other states: “Goodwill (eunoia) arises, on the whole, because of virtue and some sort of decency, when one person appears to another to be noble, brave, or something like that” (NE IX 5 1167a18–20).

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