On Flexibility: Recovery From Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield by Meir Finkel & Moshe Tlamim

Author:Meir Finkel & Moshe Tlamim [Finkel, Meir & Tlamim, Moshe]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Technology & Engineering, Strategy, Military, Political Science, Political Freedom, History, Security (National & International), Military Science, General
ISBN: 9780804774895
Google: CBJbQLTbArAC
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Published: 2011-02-28T11:46:27+00:00

[t]he air defense units entered the fighting in October 1973 knowing that they were capable of paralyzing the enemy’s air movement and preventing it from maneuvering thanks to the enemy’s mobility and supremacy in the air and theater of operations. They also had technical data, the most important of which was the ability to conceal the gaps in the radar scanning field at low altitudes and integrate air defense elements with fighter aircraft . . . The enemy failed to surprise our forces with new weapons or devices that might have enhanced the capabilities of the enemy’s planes without our forces knowing about them.31

It is my contention that the IAF was surprised by two basic factors. First, at its inability to implement its warfighting doctrine; second, at the paucity of information on the SA-6 threat.

Gordon claims that the IAF’s failure to destroy the anti-aircraft layout on October 7 stems from its inability to implement its doctrine32 that had been designed to defend Israel’s air space from air attacks, neutralize the enemy’s anti-aircraft layouts, and only later assist the ground forces.33 Naturally the doctrine was not realized, but the reason was not only what Gordon claims—the decision by the political level and chief of staff—but also the doctrine’s “over-sensitivity” to changes in its basic assumptions. An example of this is the cancellation of Operation “Dugman 5” because of weather conditions. “Dugman 5” and “Tagar” were predicated on the prevalence of good weather conditions that would allow the pilots to identify the batteries. On the morning of October 6, the political level called off “Dugman 5,” as stated, though it could not have been carried out even if it had received the go-ahead signal because of heavy cloud formations. The weather factor intervened as a surprise although it should not have. Clausewitz recognized the fickleness of weather as a friction factor: “Fog can prevent the enemy from being seen in time . . . Rain can prevent a battalion from arriving . . .”34

A statement like “the air force’s failure was due to weather conditions that hampered the realization of its doctrine” would probably not have been accepted as a legitimate excuse. The flaw in the doctrine stemmed from the basic warfighting concept that it was based on, which was too complex and overly stipulated. Operations “Tagar” and “Dugman 5” were based on the assumption that Moltke had been wary of in the nineteenth century: “. . . no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force.”35

Giora Rom, commander of the 115th Skyhawk Squadron in the war, observed that the surprise element refuted the warfighting doctrine:

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