New Perspectives on the Union War by Gary W. Gallagher;Elizabeth R. Varon;

Author:Gary W. Gallagher;Elizabeth R. Varon; [Gallagher, Gary W.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Lightning Source Inc. (Tier 2)
Published: 2019-06-22T20:00:00+00:00

Figure 5 “The Cabinet at Washington.” Edward Bates (second from the right) appears as the most physically imposing member of Lincoln’s cabinet in this Harper’s Weekly’s illustration from July 1861.

Source: Harper’s Weekly, July 13, 1861, 437.

Within weeks of Bates’s appointment to Lincoln’s cabinet, however, the Union was in true crisis. South Carolina passed an ordinance of secession on December 20, 1860, and within six weeks six other Deep South states did the same. Bates believed that the “madness of the hour” was the work of “a few extremists,” so he entreated Lincoln to pursue some sort of compromise with Southern moderates. John J. Crittenden of Kentucky—founder of the Constitutional Union Party and Bates’s friend—had proposed a set of compromise measures; among these were provisions that would protect slavery where it already existed and extend the Missouri Compromise line into the territories, protecting the future of slavery south of that line. Though Bates staunchly opposed the expansion of slavery into the territories, he encouraged Lincoln to consider extending the Missouri Compromise line. There was little territory south of this line, and what there was was ill-suited to slavery. “The Republican party, in its strength . . . can afford to be magnanimous,” he implored, “and the rather, in this instance, because the practical value of the concession is little or nothing, there being now, little or no territory on which it can operate.” Bates made a similar argument about the amendment protecting slavery where it already existed. “If the very inception of the proposition stops seditious action, & proving pursuant peace, our main policy is gained,” he said, “it will save the pride of those southern men (they are many) who feel they have been too hastily committed, & only desire a fair excuse for coming back to their proper places.”50

Bates beseeched Lincoln to pursue the path of compromise and conciliation—for this, he believed, was the only chance of saving the Union without civil war. He warned Lincoln explicitly about the dangers of radicalism at such a precarious moment. “I see abundant signs . . . of a design to throw firebrands into the Republican party,” he warned, “and I cannot quite divest myself of the suspicion that, even under this most grave & important matter, a trap of that sort may be concealed—a scheme to catch you in your talk, & embroil you with your friends.” Now, more than ever, Bates sought to convey to Lincoln the importance of the president’s rhetoric. If Lincoln were to be taken in by the arguments of radicals or even to employ the “ill-considered phrases” he had sometimes used in the “excitement of political debate,” he could ruin any chance of a peaceful restoration of the Union. Bates thus encouraged Lincoln to pursue a conciliatory course, which would give him the chance to demonstrate his conservative intentions and subdue the hysteria in the South. “The danger is imminent, & the evil impending no less than dismemberment & civil war,” Bates pleaded. “The question is

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