NATO in the Crucible by Hanagan Deborah L.;

Author:Hanagan, Deborah L.; [Hanagan, Deborah L.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Hoover Institution Press
Published: 2019-02-27T16:00:00+00:00

FIGURE 3: Weekly reported security incidents, December 2011–May 2015. Source: Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015.

The center-of-gravity shift coincided with Karzai’s announcements of the third and fourth transition tranches in May and December 2012. With these two phases, twenty-three of the thirty-four provinces entered transition and 87 percent of the population was secured by the ANSF.741 ISAF forces assumed an enabling role as Afghan forces assumed primary responsibility for security. As a result, coalition members were much less involved in fighting the insurgents and coalition casualty rates dropped precipitously in 2013 and 2014 (see figs. 4 and 5).

The Taliban coalition was aware of the transition plan and it could be argued the insurgents intentionally reduced their violent activities as they waited for ISAF to withdraw. However, this was not how ISAF assessed the situation. Throughout the transition process, the coalition continued to assess that the insurgents were resilient, although they shifted their tactics. The insurgents tried to avoid direct confrontation with the Afghan security forces, relying instead on more IED use, high-profile attacks, and soft-target attacks, such as assassinations and kidnappings. They launched annual campaigns during 2011–13 to regain territory and influence, but they failed. ISAF attributed the declining violence and diminishing Taliban operational capabilities to ANSF capabilities and a continued high operational tempo—major operations actually increased 21 percent in 2012. As the ANSF took over security responsibility, it focused on pushing insurgents out of densely populated areas and it demonstrated the ability to plan and carry out high-level military activities. Operation Kalak Hode V in September 2012 exemplified that capability. The Afghan National Army’s 205th Corps led this three-week operation comprised of 11,000 army and police forces in Zabul Province. More important, the operation was logistically supported through Afghan supply channels. The 205th Corps repeated the large-scale operation in Kalak Hode VI in 2013, but in Uruzgan. Afghan-led operations in key provinces in all the regions (including Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni, Khowst, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, Badghis, Faryab, Balkh, Kunduz, and Baghlan) over the years not only ensured the ANSF maintained security in the areas that transitioned but also substantially improved the security of the large population centers. Kabul became one of the least violent areas of the country. ISAF noted that enemy attacks disproportionately occurred in rural areas.742

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