MacArthur's Coalition by Dean Peter J

Author:Dean, Peter J. [Peter J. Dean]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780700626052
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Published: 2018-03-07T00:00:00+00:00

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

The first of these problems, command and control, was solved with the arrival of Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbey and VII Phib in late December 1942.56 Barbey was an outstanding choice for his command. He had considerable experience in amphibious warfare, having worked on the issue with the USMC in the interwar period. Most recently, he had been on Admiral King’s staff in the amphibious warfare section testing and developing the new landing ships and craft. US naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison described his appointment as a “Christmas gift for MacArthur.”57 While experienced and hardworking, at first Barbey was not universally respected. Col. Arthur G. Trudeau, an engineering officer in the US Army, noted “that he lacks drive and I would never classify him as an advanced thinker. That the entire picture of amphibious operations is still in a muddle mess is no tribute to Barbey.”58 Trudeau’s assessment may well have been influenced by the competition between the USN and the US Army over the latter’s amphibious engineers. However, Barbey soon established himself as one of the true aficionados of amphibious warfare in World War II. Most significantly Barbey, like Kenney, developed a close rapport with MacArthur, and through his progressive thinking, adaptability, and impressive control of his command, he became, along with Adm. Bull Halsey, was one of the very few USN officers MacArthur ever esteemed.59

While Barbey’s arrival started with a fight for control with GHQ, eventually MacArthur relented. GHQ then set up VII Phib to report directly to GHQ for operational control (rather than through the Seventh Fleet), and Barbey was given command of all amphibious training and forces allocated to the SWPA.60 However, not everyone was happy with Barbey assuming control. While the move caused resentment among some of the staff at GHQ and upset Van Volkenburgh, as it meant that he would be superseded as CO of JOOTS, it was outright opposed by the Australians.61

With the arrival of VII Phib, the Australians felt they were being pushed out and that their ability to influence the development of amphibious warfare in the theater would be severely limited. Therefore, Blamey made a play to separate the Australians out of this new command arrangement and established their own combined operations command that would liaise with VII Phib when required but remain outside of Barbey’s command.62 This was obviously an intuitive response to the problems at JOOTS, with amphibious training in 1942, and the US-Australian relationship more generally, but it spelled disaster for the future of a unified command structure.

Fortunately, Barbey responded vigorously, and GHQ backed its new amphibious commander, whereby Blamey had no option but to relent.63 As a concession, Barbey realized that it would be critical to include Australians on this staff and for a close bond to develop with the Australians at both the training and operational levels. A number of Australian officers were attached to Barbey’s HQ, the most import of them being Brig. Ronald Hopkins, formerly BGS of Adv NGF. Hopkins would play

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