Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse by O'Neill Bard E

Author:O'Neill, Bard E. [O'Neill, Bard E.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Published: 2008-07-05T06:27:00+00:00

A final aspect of initiative that deserves mention is what Hyde has called the dramatic gesture. Insurgents employ this tactic, which may involve guerrilla, conventional, or terrorist acts, to convince world and domestic opinion that they are not just rabble but are active and fighting for a worthwhile goal. Along these lines, Shadi Abdullah, an Islamic militant, revealed that the leader of Al Tawhid wa al-Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War"), Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, planned major attacks in Germany in 2002 that, in Abdullah's view, would have made the organization "very famous." As he put it, "It would have had the same message as the attacks of Al Qaida on Sept. 11, namely that our organization is as active in other parts of the world.""

The problem with dramatic gestures, of course, is that they frequently indicate not only that other techniques for gaining popular support have failed but that their effects will be short-lived if they are not followed by the skilled use of the other techniques. Moreover, terrorist acts may have the effect of alienating the people if they are repugnant. As mentioned before, a case in point was the backlash from the general population and even some insurgents when the Red Brigades murdered Aldo Moro, the former Italian prime minister, in 1978. The infamous seizure of the school in the Russian town of Beslan by Chechen secessionists in September 2004 may have a similar midterm, negative effect for the Chechens, and perhaps for Islamic militants in general, if the immediate outpouring of criticism and indignation by Muslim intellectuals is any indicator. Whether it does will depend on government reforms and enlightened policies that take advantage of the psychological fallout. By contrast, reliance on counterforce and revenge will simply neutralize anti-insurgent feelings and, thus, eliminate an opportunity to reduce popular support for the insurgents.32

Coercion

Despite their best efforts, insurgents may still find major segments of the population unresponsive. When this happens, there is a great temptation to turn to the final technique for gaining support, coercion. This is the least effective because of the resentment it causes and the weak commitment of those who are directly victimized. The situation in insurgent-controlled areas of El Salvador during 1984 amply demonstrated this point. Frustrated by a lack of support, the insurgents pressured peasants to collectivize plots of land to feed the rebel forces, to send their children to insurgent-run schools, to form labor gangs to repair roads and carry wounded guerrillas, and to join military units as fighters. Young men who did not respond favorably were abducted and compelled to join. The bitterness that resulted was obvious to visiting journalists and acknowledged by insurgent cadres. One leader of the Popular Liberation Forces said, "We do not renounce our right to recruit from the population, but we realize that our image has been damaged by the recruitment. It is better to build the consciousness of the people to induce them to join us"33

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