Broken Stiletto: Command And Control Of The Joint Task Force During Operation Eagle Claw At Desert One by Major William C. Flynt III

Author:Major William C. Flynt III
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2015-10-12T16:00:00+00:00

Movement To And Actions At Desert One

Operation Eagle Claw began poorly. At Masirah, the take-off order of the C-130s’ became jumbled as they taxied into position, and the subsequent aircraft formation was never corrected. Not only was this an amateurish beginning, but two of the aircraft nearly collided while taxiing (see Appendix A: Figure Seven compared to Figure Two).{81}

The helicopters lifted off the U.S. S. Nimitz and all went well until the helicopters had crossed the Iranian coast and traveled approximately 140 nautical miles. At that point the crew of Helicopter 6 received an indication of a problem with its rotor blades and chose to abort the mission. Helicopter 6 landed inside Iran and its crew was picked up by Helicopter 8. As a result the flight was reduced to seven aircraft and Helicopter 8 was now trailing the flight by about 15 minutes (see Appendix A: Figure Eight).

Two-hundred and thirty nautical miles from the U.S.S. Nimitz, the flight encountered the first of two “haboobs,” or suspended dust clouds. These dust clouds obscured visibility, and greatly increased the stress on the helicopters and crews. The first haboob was approximately 45 nautical miles deep, and the helicopter flight pressed on through it. Beyond the first haboob, however, was a second haboob (see Appendix A: Figure Nine). On encountering the second haboob, the flight leader in Helicopter 1 turned out of the second haboob and landed in the clear area between the two dust clouds, followed by Helicopter 2. Unfortunately, the remainder of the flight did not see Helicopters 1 and 2 turn out of the dust cloud, and the flight continued on. Helicopters 1 and 2 lifted off and resumed their flight thirty-five minutes after the other helicopters had passed them (see Appendix A: Figure Ten). The planned flight formation had become seriously disrupted.

The helicopter flight formation now consisted of essentially three separate groups of helicopters: Helicopters 3, 4, 5, and 7 comprising the first group; Helicopter 8 flying alone 15 minutes behind the main group; and the flight leader in Helicopter 1, with Helicopter 2 following, trailing about 35 minutes behind the main group (see Appendix A: Figure Ten). At this point Unity of Command within the helicopter formation had been totally lost, and the three separate groups of helicopters were basically “on their own.”

The helicopter flight was again diminished when Helicopter 5 developed trouble with its on-board navigation equipment and aborted the mission. Helicopter 5 turned around and made for the Nimitz. This helicopter was carrying Colonel Pitman who was the informally recognized, albeit not officially appointed, leader of the helicopter element (see Appendix A: Figure Eleven). This left six helicopters flying towards Desert One, the minimum needed to accomplish the mission.{82} Less than six helicopters had been established as the abort criteria for the rescue force and had been briefed to General Jones.{83} Fewer than six helicopters would require the rescue force to turn back. The flight was now in four separate groups. Helicopters 3 and 4 were leading.

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