Bismarck and Hood: The Battle of the Denmark Strait - a Technical Analysis for a New Perspective by Marco Santarini

Author:Marco Santarini [Santarini, Marco]
Language: eng
Format: epub, azw3
Publisher: Fonthill Media
Published: 2014-04-28T22:00:00+00:00

5.2 Investigation of terminal aspects

Terminal aspects are highly significant in relation to Holland’s closing manoeuvre and appear to support the author’s ‘against-the-tide’ interpretation.5 Roskill illustrates the dilemma that might have tormented Holland.6 Namely that the most favourable fighting distance for the Prince of Wales seemed to be greater than 13,000 yards (11,900 m), whereas the Hood’s optimum engagement distance was thought to be around 12,000 yards (11,000 m). However, if the Prince of Wales was considered at risk when the distance from the opponent was under 13,000 yards, that was due to the possibility of large-calibre shells hitting the armoured belt (14 inches, 356 mm, thick) and penetrating it. Strangely enough, this fear did not also include the Hood, whose armoured belt had a maximum thickness of 305 mm, rapidly tapering to significantly thinner values. In fact, incredibly, for this battlecruiser the recommended distance from the enemy was almost, 12,000 yards! This interpretation hardly seems credible. It might be the result of the more or less automatic association prevailing in the Royal Navy after the Battle of Jutland of a battlecruiser lacking horizontal protection. Also, at 12,000 yards the British 381/42 shells would have easily pierced the Hood’s maximum vertical protection; of this fact Holland was surely aware.

On this subject, David Mearns and Rob White rightly observe that ‘[…] the enemy’s shells, on a flatter trajectory, would be more likely to strike his side armour rather than his deck armour’.7 The truth of this statement can be checked by comparing the following values referring to 24 May at 0600:

The portion of the Hood’s hitting space related to the horizontal surfaces of the ship was equal to 5,639 m2 (according to a realistic estimation), i.e. the total area of the decks exposed to the so-called plunging fire.8

The portion of the Hood’s hitting space related to the vertical surfaces of the ship was about 19,303 m2 (according to a realistic estimation), i.e. the surface exposed to shells capable of piercing the Hood’s sides, including the parts under the waterline.

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