Barbarossa Derailed, Volume 1 by David Glantz

Author:David Glantz
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Bisac Code 1: HIS027130
ISBN: eBook ISBN: 9781907677502
Publisher: Helion and Company
Published: 2010-11-02T04:00:00+00:00

See Map 50. Armeegruppe Guderian’s assault, 5 August 1941.

As tragic as it was to Timoshenko, Group Kachalov’s defeat elicited a distinctly vindictive reaction from an irate Stalin, who on 16 August signed Stavka Order No. 270, which condemned the “cowardly actions” of the defeated and dead Kachalov and others who failed to resist with sufficient resolve. The order declared, “While in encirclement together with the group of force’s staff, Lieutenant-General Kachalov, the commander of 28th Army, displayed cowardice and fell captive to the German Fascists.”56 The disgraced Kachalov was not exonerated of these charges and rehabilitated until long after war’s end.

Although it took two days more for German forces to clear the immense battlefield, Guderian reported to Hitler about his outstanding success on 4 August. When the Germans tallied up Kachalov’s losses, they counted 38,561 prisoners-of-war and 250 tanks and tracked vehicles, 713 guns of all types, and almost 2,000 trucks, vehicles, and prime movers either destroyed or captured. This amounted to well over 80 percent of Group Kachalov’s initial force.

If the destruction of Group Kachalov represented a serious blow to Timoshenko’s counteroffensive, it also strengthened both his and the Stavka’s belief that the Smolensk-Moscow axis indeed remained the most vital sector of the front. Therefore, both parties resolved to do all in their power to thwart German intentions by mounting ever more imposing counteroffensive action in the future. This, of course, was predicated on extracting as many forces as possible from the Smolensk pocket to the north.

From the German perspective, Kachalov’s defeat seemed to offer new opportunities, although serious disagreements existed over just what those opportunities were. For example, when he presented Hitler with the exciting news of his victory at Roslavl’, Guderian also informed his Führer that, since he had found hardly any enemy south of Roslavl’, it would be a propitious moment for his army group to continue its advance northeastward along the Moscow shosse toward Spas Demensk and Viaz’ma. If Hoth’s Third Panzer Group could also reach Viaz’ma from the west, Guderian suggested, it might just set the stage for the final drive on Moscow. However, since by now Hitler had decided to clear Army Group Center’s southern flank before attacking Moscow, the Führer listened to the only those parts of Guderian’s report regarding a possible advance toward Gomel’ from the north to close the growing gap between Army Groups Center and South. From Hitler’s perspective, Guderian’s success at Roslavl’ seemed to offer ideal circumstances for his army group to cooperate with Weichs’ Second Army in another major encirclement battle, this time centered on Gomel’. Logically, in Hitler’s mind, this encirclement battle might even become the initial phase of a far more immense and decisive encirclement battle in the Kiev region.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.