An Introduction to Indian Philosophy by Gupta Bina

Author:Gupta, Bina
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Viśeṣa (Particularity)

Things not only are experienced as being alike, they are also perceived as being different, and even when they share the same qualities they are distinct, e.g., though all the cows have cowness, one cow is different from another cow. Viśeṣa is an entity, again a real entity, which accounts for this ultimate distinctness of individuals. The use of such indexicals as “this” or “that,” does not explain individuality, but presupposes it. Therefore, we need a new category to explain individuality of entities.

The first attempt is to explain individuality by some quality (or guṇa) of an individual thing. But two things may have all the same qualities, e.g., twins, but they are still distinct. Could each one's distinctness be due to the stuff it is made of, its “matter” (a position which Aristotle held)? But then we are led to ask, what distinguishes the stuff of the one from the stuff of the other identical twin? We may ask, what distinguishes one atom from another? The Vaiśeṣika answer is: Each otherwise non-distinguishable partless particular possesses its own particularity, which is a real entity as much as the universals are. The particularity of wholes is accounted for by the particularities of its parts, but when we come to further partless entities the same explanation won't do; we have to stop somewhere in order to avoid an infinite regress and recognize a new real feature, its own particularity, only for individuals that do not possess parts. Each atom (also each soul) has its own particularity. So the Vaiśeṣika argues that particularity is the unique individuality of the eternal substances, e.g., space, time, ether, minds, souls, and atoms of earth, water, fire, and air.

It is worth noting that “particularity” is not a universal feature of distinct particulars. Ordinary objects of the world, for example, pitchers, tables, and chairs, are made up of parts, and so do not require particularity to explain them. Particularity is required to explain the differences among the partless eternal substances. The particularity of an atom or of a soul is not perceived, but inferred. Furthermore, to regard particularity as a universal would be self-contradictory, it would contradict the very sense of “particularity.”

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