The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Classics of Naval Literature) by Buell Thomas B

Author:Buell, Thomas B. [Buell, Thomas B.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781612512112
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Published: 2013-07-31T00:00:00+00:00

As if to accentuate the threat from Truk, the Japanese demonstrated the vulnerability of American amphibious forces to air attack. In the darkness of early morning on 12 February, a half-dozen Japanese seaplanes from Saipan via Ponape bombed the Marine supply dump at Roi and the nearby landing ships unloading at the beach. Their accuracy was perfect. Twenty-five Marines were killed, 130 were wounded, and several ships were lost. Over 80 percent of the Marines’ supplies were destroyed in a stupendous conflagration, and the garrison had to live on emergency rations for two weeks until fresh supplies were landed. The successful Japanese air raid was an impetus to protect the Eniwetok amphibious assault forces from similar attacks.3

Spruance had shifted his flag to the battleship because he hoped to catch a large number of Japanese ships in the Truk lagoon anchorages. Once Mitscher’s carrier planes began their attack, the Japanese warships would flee for open water, and Spruance wanted to be there to greet them. The New Jersey, with her 32-knot speed and 16-inch guns, would be in the thick of action, and Spruance wanted to be where the action was.

Spruance in his new flagship got underway from Majuro and rendezvoused with Task Force 58 on 14 February. The ships refueled from fleet oilers and shaped course for Truk. Spruance assumed tactical command, a departure from his normal practice of allowing the next senior admiral (in this case Mitscher) to act as OTC. The staff thus became unexpectedly busy in controlling the movements of the three carrier task groups, comprising 9 carriers, 7 battleships, 10 cruisers, and 28 destroyers.

The task force steamed on, apparently undetected, with Spruance maintaining firm control of the course, speed, and cruising disposition. On the fifteenth Spruance broadcast his intentions for the next day’s strike: the force would close Truk from the northeast to 60 miles, then at 0630 would change course to east-northeast (the direction of the estimated wind) and increase speed to 20 knots. Not until then would he allow Mitscher to act as OTC and to begin launching the air attack. Spruance had usurped Mitscher’s prerogatives by issuing such detailed instructions, normally the province of the carrier task force commander.

Spruance’s action was contrary to his recent reaffirmation of the wisdom of trusting his subordinates. Why, then, his iron grip on the carriers for the approach on Truk? His reasons must be inferred. The Truk raid was extremely dangerous. If Task Force 58 made one bad move, the alerted Truk air and sea forces could hit Spruance before he hit them. He knew that he might be forced rapidly to modify his plans. If quick decisions were needed, he did not want to take the time to discuss alternatives with Mitscher by message. One suspects, also, that Spruance was not entirely confident that the carrier admiral could execute the raid without making a potentially fatal error in judgment.

Spruance had Baldy Pownall aboard as his trusted aviation advisor, and he could rely upon Pownall to help devise the aviation tactics.

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