The German Generals Talk by Basil H. Liddell Hart

Author:Basil H. Liddell Hart [Hart, Basil H. Liddell]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780688060121
Amazon: 0688060129
Publisher: W. Morrow
Published: 1971-09-01T23:00:00+00:00

Chapter Twelve – Misfires in the Mediterranean

Discussion with the German generals brought fresh light on many facets of the campaign in North Africa and the war in the Mediterranean as a whole. Here are some of the chief points that came out.

Egypt and the Suez Canal were saved, at the time the British forces were weakest, by the Italians’ jealousy of the Germans coupled with Hitler’s indifference to the opportunity of capturing these keys to the Middle East.

Cyprus was saved by the price the British made the Germans pay for the capture of Crete.

Gibraltar was saved by Franco’s reluctance to let the Germans into Spain.

Malta was saved by Hitler’s distrust of the Italian Navy.

All that happened during 1941, when Britain’s fortunes were at their lowest. In 1942 the tide began to turn, with Russia’s sustained resistance to Hitler’s invasion, with the entry of America into the war following Japan’s assault, and with the growth of Britain’s own strength. But there was a long road to travel. It might have been longer but for Hitler’s help.

It was Hitler who ensured the British the chance to win such a victory at El Alamein as to decide the war in North Africa. For he forbade his generals to forestall Montgomery’s attack by a timely step back that would have preserved them from crushing defeat.

I gathered these revelations from various generals, but most of all from General von Thoma, the famous tank commander who was finally captured at Alamein, and from General Student, the Commander-in-Chief of Germany’s airborne forces.

Thoma related the origins of Germany’s entry into the Mediterranean field. “I was sent to North Africa in October, 1940, to report on the question whether German forces should be sent there, to help the Italians turn the British out of Egypt. After seeing Marshal Graziani, and studying the situation, I made my report. It emphasized that the supply problem was the decisive factor — not only because of the difficulties of the desert, but because of the British Navy’s command of the Mediterranean. I said it would not be possible to maintain a large German Army there as well as the Italian Army.

“My conclusion was that, if a force was sent by us, it should be an armoured force. Nothing less than four armoured divisions would suffice to ensure success — and this, I calculated, was also the maximum that could be effectively maintained with supplies in an advance across the desert to the Nile valley. At the same time, I said it could only be done by replacing the Italian troops with German. Large numbers could not be supplied, and the vital thing was that every man in the invading force should be of the best possible quality.

“But Badoglio and Graziani opposed the substitution of Germans for Italians. Indeed, at that time they were against having any German troops sent there. They wanted to keep the glory of conquering Egypt for themselves. Mussolini backed their objections. While, unlike them, he wanted some German help, he did not want a predominantly German force.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.