War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War by Wenger Andreas. Holtsmark Sven G. Mastny Vojtech

Author:Wenger, Andreas.,Holtsmark, Sven G.,Mastny, Vojtech
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781136011900
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)

Silent ally, hostile neutral?

The covert links between Sweden and the NATO-countries thus had two sides. On the one hand, there was the Swedish goal to secure vital and realistic military assistance in case of war while at the same time not compromising the policy of nonalignment in the eyes of the Soviet Union or the domestic public opinion. On the other hand, there were the goals of individual NATO-countries, of NATO's joint northern European command and of the United States as a global power.

The strategic goals in northern Europe elaborated in the NATO-plans explain the various initiatives to unofficially integrate the Swedish defense, first of all with the defenses of Denmark and Norway. But in the longer run, integrating Sweden into NATO-plans and strategies also concerned the United States and the crucial aspects of reinforcement and support in time of war. Between the Scandinavian countries this cooperation was facilitated by a curious loophole in the Swedish concept of non-alignment; political and military contacts with the Scandinavian countries were regarded as less sensitive than contacts with UK or US officials, although the practical difference might be hard to establish. The US State Department, becoming aware of these contacts, saw their potential and encouraged their NATO partners to pursue a policy of gradual, case-by-case oriented cooperation and coordination.63 This solved some problems of the perceived necessity of a common Scandinavian defense strategy. Both the political structure of NATO and the declared Swedish policy of nonalignment did however impose certain limitations as to how far an unofficial coordination could be developed.

In April 1960, the US National Security Council (NSC) issued a policy document concerning Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The strategic assessment contained the same elements as earlier NATO-plans. The Scandinavian area was of vital importance to the alliance, although the NSC adds that the value of the region as a base for western retaliatory operations is limited by Swedish neutrality and the unwillingness of Denmark and Norway to permit such use.64 Sweden's membership in NATO was however not regarded as necessary to western defense. The reason for this was not a negative attitude to Swedish neutrality or doubts on the strategic significance of Sweden for the defense of Scandinavia. On the contrary, the United States should be prepared to come to the assistance of Sweden in the event of a general war “without prejudice to US commitments to NATO.” And in case of an isolated Soviet attack, the kind of unspecified contingency mentioned in the NATO-planning documents, the United States should be prepared to come to the assistance of Sweden as part of a NATO or UN response. In a footnote this was clarified to relate only to unilateral US planning and not to planning within NATO.65

The policy toward Sweden was confirmed and further elaborated by the Kennedy administration in a Department of State Guideline in June 1962. Since the Swedish position in case of a general war could not be predetermined, it was regarded as important to secure Sweden's position in a war as “a friendly neutral.

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