War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

Author:Bruce Bueno de Mesquita [Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Publisher: Yale University Press
Published: 2008-09-30T16:00:00+00:00

B will initiate the use of force even after A offers to negotiate provided that

Inequality (5.6) clearly is more likely to be satisfied for smaller values of PB than for larger values. In fact, in the limiting case in which PB equals 1.0, it is impossible for (5.6) to be satisfied, and as PB approaches zero, it is nearly impossible for the inequality not to be satisfied. In the cases reflected by expression (5.5), the relation between relative capabilities (PB) and the magnitude of acceptable domestic political costs is indeterminate. It can go either way, depending on the relative magnitudes of the costs associated with loss of face, reputation, and so forth that accompany capitulation and the costs associated with lost life and property in a defensive war. Expressions (5.2) to (5.6) are proof of proposition 5.3. QED

Morgan and Campbell (1991) found some support for the hypothesis that strong states are unlikely to engage in violence if they face unusually large domestic constraints; they found a slight tendency for weak but highly constrained states to be more violent than strong, constrained states. Such results are consistent with the implications of inequalities (5.2), (5.6), and possibly (5.5). The anticipated strength of association is reduced by (5.3) and (5.4), as reflected in the results reported by Morgan and Campbell. The international interaction game provides a basis for comprehending puzzle 3, the Morgan and Campbell observations.

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