The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge South Asian Studies) by Jalal Ayesha

Author:Jalal, Ayesha [Jalal, Ayesha]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1985-04-18T00:00:00+00:00

1 Wavell to Amery, 14 January 1945, T.P. , v, 400 and Indian Annual Register , 1945, vol. I, p. 125.

2 Wavell optimistically detected signs of a ‘genuine rapprochement between certain Congress and League elements’. Desai, an ‘experienced politician’, was probably ‘sure of his ground’. (Wavell to Amery, 14 January 1945, T.P., V , 401.) Desai’s proposals went to the India Committee in London, which reacted cautiously.

3 See Wavell to Amery, 20 January 1945, T.P., V , 423–4.

4 It transpired that Gandhi had not given Desai authority to negotiate, and Jinnah openly denied all knowledge of the Desai–Liaquat agreement, asserting that there was ‘absolutely no foundation for connecting my name with the talks which may have taken place between Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr Bhulabhai Desai’. (Jinnah’s press interview, 22 January 1945, Indian Annual Register, 1945, vol. I , p. 33.)

5 Amery to Wavell, 17 January 1945, T.P., V , 412.

6 Attlee thought they were ‘un-democratic’. (See Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (London, 1973), p. 119.

7 Ibid., p. 120.

8 It would be more ‘democratic’, the India Committee thought, if the members of the Executive Council were chosen from a panel submitted by the provincial and central legislatures. If the Executive Council was dominated by the two main Indian political parties the Viceroy would find it difficult to override it, and for this reason his powers would have to be afforced. The first proposal meant the release of all Congress détenus since they included many assembly members. If the negotiations failed, it would be embarrassing to lock them up again. Any extension of Viceregal powers by legislation would take time and would raise counter-demands from the Congress and in turn that would alarm Muslims and other minorities. (Ibid., p. 125.)

9 See Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Joumal, pp.142–3. Jinnah asked the Viceroy to explain his proposals and then to postpone the conference for a fortnight while he consulted the League’s Working Committee. Gandhi wanted Wavell to revise his broadcast, and take account of all his objections. The mules wanted to drive the truck.

10 Gandhi to Wavell, 17 June 1945, Indian Annual Register, 1945, vol. I , p. 245.

11 As Gandhi wrote to Wavell: ‘You will quite unconsciously, but equally surely, defeat the purpose of the conference if parity between Caste-Hindus and Muslims is unalterable. Parily between the Congress and the League is understandable .’ (Ibid., [my italics].)

12 Khizar, according to Wavell, was: ‘very upset and said he had the gravest misapprehensions over what I was doing. He spoke about the loyalty of the Punjab, that there had always been a Punjab Muslim in the Executive Council since 1919, and that my approach to Congress and the League was a slap in the face for all co-operators. He said I was handing over power to the enemy, that my veto was “dead as mutton”, and prophesied chaos and disaster all round.’ (Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Joumal, p. 144.)

13 Ibid.

14 When Wavell told him that the Unionists were to

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