The Russian Art of War: How the West Led Ukraine to Sefeat by Jacques Baud

Author:Jacques Baud [Baud, Jacques]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Max Milo Editions
Published: 2024-01-17T00:00:00+00:00

Figure 37—Diagram of the planning of the Ukrainian counter-offensive on the “Rabotino-Tokmak-Melitopol” line of operations. As the New York Times points out, Ukraine has decided to abandon the tactics recommended by NATO and return to those of the former USSR. The action on Rabotino illustrates this change.

The problem was that Russian resistance was tougher than expected. The planning had been done in anticipation of a panic among the Russian military, “poorly commanded, demotivated and weakened.” But that’s not what happened. In the wake of the unsuccessful 47th Brigade, a dozen other brigades attempted the breakthrough—the 47th mechanized brigade; the 65th mechanized brigade; the 116th mechanized brigade; the 117th mechanized brigade; the 118th mechanized brigade; the “SKALA” regiment; the 78th “HERTZ” regiment; the 73rd Special Naval Operations Center; the 46th airmobile brigade; the 71st fighter brigade; the 3rd operational brigade of the National Guard “SPARTAN”; the 14th operational brigade of the National Guard “Chervona Kalyna” and the 82nd airborne assault brigade of the Guard, which was the 2nd echelon formation.

The 82nd Brigade was the 2nd echelon formation, with its CHALLENGER 2 tanks, which the British—proclaimed invincible—feared would be destroyed by the Russians. During its first engagement, at least one of them was destroyed…

By early September 2023, for example, the Ukrainians would have suffered over 50,000 casualties without managing to break through, while, according to Trent Maul, Director of Analysis at the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Russians hadn’t even committed the bulk of their forces.454

What’s more, while our media were focusing on the imminent victory of the counter-offensive,455 the Russians were making a breakthrough towards Kupiansk. The Ukrainian media outlet Kyiv Independent reported:456

Soldiers from various brigades told the Kyiv Independent that in this area, the Russians are experienced and well-equipped soldiers, with a large number of artillery shells and MLRS rockets.

Like most units, the 32nd was short of vehicles and artillery ammunition. Most of the good equipment is deployed for the counter-offensive on the Zaporizhzhia front.

It also lacks battlefield experience, from the lowest ranks to commanding officers… The year 2022 has reduced Ukraine’s pool of experienced fighters to such an extent that we can speak of a shortage.

The Ukrainian media, confirmed by an analysis by the British RUSI,457 told us exactly the opposite of what our media or the “experts” on our TV sets were saying.458

In fact, without sufficient air and artillery support, the Ukrainian army could not use the tactics envisaged by Western planners and break through the Russian system. Contrary to what some “experts” claimed, Ukraine was not “reverting” to Soviet tactics, but was adapting to its adversary, with tactics that had absolutely nothing to do with the USSR.

Thus, from the summer of 2023, the Ukrainian army would attack in small groups of foot infantry, supported by one or two battle tanks, which acted as “assault guns.” As Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov explained to his American counterpart Lloyd Austin, on June 15, 2023, in Brussels:459

Without air support, the only option is to use artillery to hit the Russian lines, dismount targeted vehicles and continue on foot.

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