The Principal Agent Model and the European Union by Tom Delreux & Johan Adriaensen

Author:Tom Delreux & Johan Adriaensen
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham

4 Theoretical Argument

The external environment clearly affects the relations between principals and agents of EU conflict resolution. Despite more general ambitions to enhance the newly created institutions, we particularly identify the external environment as a source of increased discretion for the EEAS. The urgency of the context and the interplay with third parties constitute important factors for increased agent discretion. In addition, some institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty equipped the agent with powers that can potentially be used to increase the discretion of the EEAS vis-à-vis the principals. This internal dimension of strategies to influence the politics of delegation might also give rise to an agent which increasingly pursues own interests and thus acquires interest-induced discretion .

From a theoretical perspective, our core argument emphasizes that the agent’s discretion can be affected by the characteristics of the external environment. Specific strategies that exploit pressures of urgency and third party interplay , which are particularly felt on the agent side of the relationship between principals and agent, then refer to structure-induced discretion . Increasingly, EU foreign policy takes place in a complex environment shaped by urgency and the involvement of third parties. It is embedded in an intense web of coordination and cooperation with virtually every country and most regions in the world. While interaction with third parties is a specific goal of the EU—expressed with the creation of the EEAS—it also creates pressures to adapt to the positions of other actors that are particularly felt on the agent side. Many decisions and actions of the agent additionally require substantial flexibility since the environment in which the tasks are fulfilled is characterized by swiftly changing dynamics. Frequently, foreign policy primarily reacts to the urgency of specific events.

In addition, interest-induced factors that increase the discretion of the agent, such as agenda-setting powers, apparently affect the principal–agent relationship. In particular, the powers of the EEAS in chairing and drafting constitute important “instruments” in this regard. Agents not only pursue their own interests and develop an institutional memory, but can make attempts to alter the preferences of their principals, for instance by creating (perceived) constraints to veto or change proposals put forward by the agent.

In summary, we contribute to the literature on the principal–agent model by specifically focusing on the agent and the external environment as a source for increased discretion. We have also shown that the principal–agent model is applicable to complex policy domains such as conflict resolution and that the complexity of the context might increase agent discretion. In addition, we emphasize that discretion is also affected by agent actions and internal factors that may impact on the range of independent action available to the agent for the fulfilment of their tasks.

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