The Karabakh Conflict Between Armenia and Azerbaijan by M. Hakan Yavuz;Michael M. Gunter; & Michael M. Gunter

Author:M. Hakan Yavuz;Michael M. Gunter; & Michael M. Gunter
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783031162626
Publisher: Springer Nature

Iran

Neighboring Iran next tried its diplomatic hand, arranging two cease-fires in February 1992 and a meeting among representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran in Tehran from March 14–16. Often forgotten as an interested party, Iran, of course, not only bordered both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also lay just south of greater Karabakh. Thus, violence could easily spill over into Iran and destabilize its large ethnic Azerbajani population. However, an Iranian brokered peace proved illusory and fighting resumed by the end of the month. The Iranians blamed the military leadership of the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), that is Russia, although specifics were lacking.25

However, almost immediately Iran renewed attempts to restart negotiations. Mahmoud Vaezi began shuttle diplomacy to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, where he held several meetings, which led to a formal meeting of the states’ two leaders in Tehran on May 7, 1992. The resulting Tehran Communique was mediated by Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and signed by Yagub Mammadov, the acting president of Azerbaijan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the president of Armenia. It provided that meetings between leading representatives from both combatants including military personnel would be held and that all disputes would be solved by peaceful means on the basis of the principles of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, subsequently OSCE), international law, and the UN Charter. Mahmoud Vaezi, the Iranian envoy was to initiate the process by visiting Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert and also involve CSCE observers for the continuation of mediation efforts.

Although the Iranian set process seemed well formulated and Iranian prestige was imbedded, the effort collapsed the very next day, when Armenian troops attacked and captured the Azerbaijani city of Shusha (an important cultural heritage) on May 8, 1992 before acting Azerbaijani president Yagub Mammadov could even return from Tehran. Armenian troops followed this blatant cease-fire violation by attacking and capturing Lachin on May 18. Lachin connected Karabakh with Armenia in the south and thus constituted a great prize for Armenia and a loss for Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijani authorities regarded Iran as morally responsible for the failure of negotiations. Embarrassed, Iran emphasized that it would not accept any border alterations, which implied its disapproval of the Armenian actions. A decade later former Armenian president Robert Kocharian (who came from Nagorno-Karabakh) explained that he thought Azerbaijans and Armenians were “ethnically incompatible”26 and that it was not possible for the Armenians in Karabakh to live within an Azerbaijani state.27 Walter Schwimmer, the former secretary-general of the Council of Europe, averred that Kocharian’s comments were tantamount to warmongering.28 Such attitudes testify to why successful negotiations over Karabakh proved unlikely if not impossible. Neither side was serious about negotiations.

In their analysis of why Iran’s attempts at furthering negotiations failed, Ceyhan Mahmudlu and Shamkhal Abilov listed the following four points: (1) Memories of the earlier clashes between the combatants that prevented confidence building between them; (2) Armenia’s superior military power and resulting unwillingness to mediate because it would inhibit further victories; (3) Iran’s lack of powerful status

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