The False Promise of Superiority by James H. Lebovic;

Author:James H. Lebovic;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA
Published: 2022-06-15T00:00:00+00:00

Confronting North Korea

North Korea differs substantially from China in force vulnerabilities, likely uses of nuclear weapons, and, of course, national leadership and behavior. Indeed, North Korea’s mercurial and enigmatic leadership, aggressive missile and weapons testing, and vividly colorful threats make North Korea an outlier among states. For some, then, it appears unbound by the logic required for deterrence to work.

So, when might North Korea employ its nuclear weaponry? North Korea maintains that its nuclear forces protect the country’s regime and territory. We can assume, then, that the probability of North Korean nuclear-weapons use would grow enormously if foreign forces pose a threat to the country’s government or geographical integrity. For that reason, we can also assume that such a threat—absent North Korean war initiation—is remote.

Most experts believe, in fact, that any North Korean first use of nuclear weapons would occur at the onset, or in the conduct, of a North Korean invasion of South Korea (Bennett 2010: 26). North Korea might launch nuclear weapons to weaken the capability of allied forces to resist the offensive and, simultaneously, lend credence to the country’s long-standing threat to use nuclear weapons if attacked. For these dual purposes, it can attack allied bases in Guam, Japan, and South Korea or opposition forces when mobilized for attacks (Narang and Panda 2020). Were its offensive against South Korea to fail, North Korea might employ some fraction of its nuclear arsenal—for these same military and coercive purposes—with the hope of denying victory to invading forces.37 Whether on offense or defense, North Korea could withhold a portion of the country’s ICBM force to threaten US targets, to deter an all-out US nuclear response. US leaders might hold back, then, knowing that a US nuclear strike would kill huge numbers of civilians and might still not prevent North Korea from lashing out, in retaliation, with one or more nuclear weapons. One reading of North Korean strategy suggests that the country is moving toward an “asymmetric escalation strategy” that mates conventional and nuclear capabilities to aid an offensive and constrain US nuclear options (Kang and Gibum 2017: 503).

Still, any use of nuclear weapons—by either side—would invite a substantial risk of a nuclear conflagration. At this point in the conflict, North Korea would likely be primed for follow-on attacks. After all, North Korea would have launched a conventional attack either believing that battlefield conditions had shifted in the country’s favor (behind North Korea’s nuclear-deterrence shield) or seeking to redirect domestic threats to the country’s leadership through a diversionary war. If so, the chances are great that North Korea’s leaders would have either downplayed—or accepted—the risk that the fighting (nuclear, or not) would spell the end of the North Korean regime. Indeed, the gloves might come off with the first use of nuclear weapons. North Korea might opt not to keep the bulk of its force in reserve. Its leaders might believe that the United States would not hold back—and fear their own country’s inability to retain nuclear command and control under attack (see Cho 2009: 75).

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