The Coup by Ervand Abrahamian

Author:Ervand Abrahamian [Abrahamian, Ervand]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781595588623
Publisher: New Press, The

July Uprising

Mossadeq handed in his resignation on July 16. A closed session of the Majles—with Mossadeq supporters boycotting the meeting—immediately offered the premiership to Qavam. The vote was 40, with 2 abstentions. The 40 probably included Baqai, Makki, and Haerizadeh. Qavam wasted no time accepting the offer and consulting the British embassy on the composition of his cabinet. He also offered to reopen oil negotiations.203 In a radio address to the nation, he began by boasting that he had initiated the oil nationalization campaign in 1947. He went on to promise to settle the problem as soon as possible by being “more flexible and prudent.” He ended by denouncing troublemakers, demagogues, street politicians, and “hypocrites who under the guise of fighting red extremism undermine the constitution and instead strengthen black reaction and outdated superstitions.” It was rumored that he had been offered American aid. It was also rumored that he had issued an arrest warrant for Kashani. Hassan Arsanjani, Qavam’s adviser, admitted that the speech had been a major blunder, forcing Kashani back into Mossadeq’s fold.204 Not surprisingly, Kashani joined the National Front and the bazaar guilds in calling for mass protests. He proclaimed “foreign powers were using Qavam to undermine the nation’s religion, freedom, and independence.” 205

The call for mass protests was seconded by the Tudeh Party. This was the first time the Tudeh had come out in full support of Mossadeq. The party called for a nationwide general strike and urged supporters to pour into the streets. The British embassy estimated more than 90 percent of organized labor in Tehran, especially in industry, heeded the Tudeh call.206 Immediately after the uprising, Kashani thanked the Tudeh for helping bring “victory against British imperialism.” 207 Both Fateh and Arsanjani—neither of whom by any stretch of the imagination could be described as pro-Tudeh—credited the party for playing the crucial role in the whole uprising.208 This reflected major change in Tudeh policy. Until then, ultra-leftists had dominated the leadership and had tended to label Mossadeq as a pro-American “lackey.” From that point on, more pragmatic leaders, notably Nuraldin Kianuri, held the majority in the central committee and tended to see Mossadeq as “an anti-imperialist patriot.” 209

The crisis came to a head on July 21. After three days of intermittent protests and work stoppages, especially in the bazaars, most cities were shaken on that day by general strikes and massive demonstrations. Tehran began the day ominously quiet—almost all offices, shops, markets, factories, buses, and taxis were at a standstill. Even shops in the wealthier northern neighborhoods were shuttered. By late morning, demonstrators from the southern working-class districts as well as the central bazaar converged on Parliament Square. They were surrounded there by troops, trucks, and tanks. For five hours, the capital was in complete turmoil. One of the shah’s brothers was nearly lynched when his chauffeur took a wrong turn into an angry crowd. A statue of Reza Shah was toppled. A deputy was pelted with stones when he tried to persuade the crowd that the problem could be solved peacefully.

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