Term Limits in the State Legislatures by Carey John M.; Niemi Richard G.; Powell Lynda W

Author:Carey, John M.; Niemi, Richard G.; Powell, Lynda W.
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University of Michigan Press

On the opposite side of the legislator-staff relationship from Mayo, Dede Alpert (D-CA) is also well positioned to evaluate the importance of staff as an informational resource. Facing limits after three terms in the lower chamber, Alpert was elected to her first term in the Senate in 1996 and was immediately named chair of the Tax and Revenue Committee. As a counterpoint to Mayo, Alpert is interesting in that she concurs with respect to increasing staff influence but puts an altogether more optimistic spin on the account:

I think [the influence of staff has increased]. I feel like you have to hope that you have good staff with continuing memory and be aware of this. I know that it happened in my committee on the Senate side that [some staffers] have been with this committee through, I think, the last five chairs. So I feel very, very fortunate because they have seen it all and none of this stuff is brand new to them—where it is brand new to me; this is a new issue area for me, so that I need lots of help. It's just going to take time for me to get up to speed. I think that's becoming increasingly difficult, and as I said, it is even more so in our lower house, our Assembly, where the turnover is huge.

The juxtaposed positions of Mayo and Alpert are ironic insofar as Mayo, the staffer, regards the increased reliance on staff expertise with skepticism, whereas Alpert regards it with relief. Nevertheless, these two perspectives are highly relevant for two reasons. First, neither Mayo nor Alpert spoke speculatively but rather from the perspective of the first two states where limits took effect. Second, even within their legislatures, Mayo, as an experienced legislator turned staffer, and Alpert, as a first-term senator serving as chair of a money committee, are positioned to be particularly sensitive to the effects of term limits on the legislator-staff relationship.

We previously urged caution in interpreting the positive survey results and the interview data on the growth of staff and bureaucratic power due to informational advantages. That said, it is worth noting that the positions of all our interview subjects are mutually consistent and are consistent with the survey data. These results are strong enough that they warrant consideration, and they suggest that as term limits take effect their influence on the role of staff should be a fruitful area of research.

Effects on Interest Groups and Lobbyists

As with staff and the bureaucracy, claims about interest-group influence are central to both sides of the term-limits debate. Advocates of the reform claim that the influence of monied interests will be reduced because legislators barred from reelection will be less beholden to campaign donors. Opponents counter that term-limited politicians seeking postlegislative positions will be no less—and perhaps more—responsive to groups that can provide either direct employment or financing for subsequent campaigns and that, whatever legislators' future aspirations, interest-group lobbyists will enjoy the same informational advantages as staff and civil servants over inexperienced legislators under term limits.

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