Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars by Spencer D. Bakich

Author:Spencer D. Bakich [Bakich, Spencer D.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Iraq War (2003-2011), General, Korean War, Military, Vietnam War, Political Science, History, Security (National & International), Intelligence & Espionage
ISBN: 9780226107851
Google: 9rLbAgAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 18505954
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Published: 2014-03-20T00:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER SIX

Iraq—Win the Battle, Lose the War

On May 1, 2003, from the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln and under a banner declaring “Mission Accomplished,” President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq. In the narrowest of senses, Bush was correct. In a few short weeks, the United States and its coalition partners waged an intense and successful conventional battle, the objectives of which were to eradicate the Iraqi military as an effective combat force and to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. Had the conventional military element been the only salient measure of US strategy in the Iraq War, then in all likelihood the anticipated early withdrawal of American combat forces would have begun on schedule. Yet in a larger sense (most likely the way that Bush had intended), that declaration proved to be premature at best. Not only did American combat operations continue, but they also intensified as a hydra-headed insurgency emerged in the wake of American military operations. The rise of the Sunni insurgency, the complete collapse of Iraqi civil society, and the eventual outbreak of communal civil war, was precisely the opposite political outcome the United States sought. Top administration officials desired the emergence of a stable and democratic Iraqi state—a democracy in the heart of a region dominated by authoritarian states, from which the majority of militant jihadists originate. By mid-2003, the battle against Saddam had been won. The war the administration desired and envisioned, however, was lost with the explosion of the insurgency, the continued infiltration of foreign terrorists, and the realization that American forces would have to be committed in Iraq for far longer than the president and his most influential advisers believed would be necessary. In short, the limited war in Iraq escalated, first, horizontally with the introduction of a host of new combatants, and then durationally as the United States began the slow process of waging counterinsurgency warfare.

The causes of the Sunni insurgency stemmed directly from the contradictory military and diplomatic objectives that were sought prior to and during the initial phases of one of America’s longest wars. In turn, the causes of these faulty strategic choices originated from a dysfunctional decision-making process that was incapable of incorporating information within the US government that clearly showed how postconflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts would be stymied unless that United States committed a large number of troops to the war and was prepared to incorporate Iraqi administrative and security institutions into the occupation phase of the campaign. At the same time, however, that structure of strategic decision making generated a war plan that achieved the stated, if limited, military objectives. Understanding the relationship between America’s military success and diplomatic failure is the objective of this chapter.

In the pages that follow, I first present an overview of America’s conflict with Iraq to demonstrate how despite having achieved its military objectives, the United States failed to secure its diplomatic objectives. Second, I describe how the American information institution prior to and during the war was moderately truncated.

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