Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy by D. M. Spitzer;

Author:D. M. Spitzer;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781000845204
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Unlimited)
Published: 2023-01-12T00:00:00+00:00

Notes

All translations of Plato are from Cooper and Hutchinson (1997).

Presumably, the Spirited faculty, too, is subject to some persuasion and education.

In this essay, the name Socrates refers exclusively to the character in Plato’s dialogues. I take it that this dramatic figure represents, among other things, the philosopher or the practice of philosophy enacted by someone whose soul is justly governed by reason.

The autonomy of reason (λογιστικόν) seems essential to knowing. Witness to this is Socrates’ insistence that his teaching is maieutic (Tht. 149a–151d) added to the claim that the most courageous and wisest of souls is the one least liable to be altered by external influences (Resp. 381a).

Socrates describes Theaetetus’ restlessness about his inability to define knowledge, his ignorance in the matter, not as an emptiness but as a pregnancy (Tht. 148e). Recollection also points to the desire to know arising from fullness, as does Diotima (Symp. 206e).

Resp. 434d–445e and most of the text after the division becomes part of the search for justice.

“Yet, surely, the story [of Leontius] suggests that anger sometimes makes war against the appetites as one thing against another” (Resp. 440a–b; my interpolation).

It is worth noting that the examples show strong links between the desiring elements, i.e., reason’s self-harm co-opts the appetites and/or θυμός.

Notice the caveat: “And if there turn out to be any intervening elements…” (Resp. 443e). The comment invites dialogue and inquiry about the division of the soul.

My sense is that when either Parmenides or a Stranger directs the inquiry, readers can observe νοῦς at work. Socrates points to the work of νοῦς when he introduces dialectic, the method through which thinking looks to νοῦς for justification.

Consider, for example, Cephalus in Book I of the Republic. There are very few appetite-driven interlocutors. I suspect that is the case because reason speaks directly to spiritedness which in turn brings the appetites along.

“Recognizing his fighting spirit and his excitement, I asked him: ‘So what is that to you? Has Protagoras done anything wrong to you?’” (Prt. 310d).

Protagoras’ conduct brings to mind the description of a sophist in Theaetetus, as someone who “would keep on refuting you and not let you go till you had been struck with wonder at his wisdom….” (Tht. 165d–e).

Socrates personifies arguments in other dialogues, i.e., Tht. 191a; in Cri. 50a–54d Socrates both personifies and impersonates the laws of Athens.

For example, the Charmides inquires into moderation, the Laches and the Protagoras into courage, and the Republic into justice as well as all the other virtues.

On Prodicus’ art of division and the famous story of Herakles’ choice, see Xen. Mem. 2.1.21–23.

See Scodel (2010, 56–71). See also Scott (2013).

Ap. 30a–b identifies that mission to involve bringing others to care about virtue.

Meno’s responses have implications both for knowledge and for virtue. A discussion of each definition would take us far afield and what next needs our consideration is how Socrates proceeds in seeking to educate a spirited person whose reason is saturated by teachings. The debater’s argument and the myth of recollection amply show Socrates at work and the power that reason has to educate and release from tyranny an uneducated soul.

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