Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea by Jeffrey T. Richelson

Author:Jeffrey T. Richelson [Richelson, Jeffrey T.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
Published: 2007-09-17T06:00:00+00:00

WHILE THE U.S. intelligence community attempted to follow South Africa’s nuclear activities, those managing the South African program were also determined to limit the information that could be collected from space, in the air, and on the ground—with the 1977 Kalahari incident no doubt firmly in mind. As in other nations, compartmentalization, through the use of code words, restricted knowledge of the nuclear program or parts of the program to those with a “need to know.” The names Kraal (an Afrikaaner word for the stone wall that farmers once built to protect livestock, roughly translated as “Circle”) and Kierktoring (“Church Tower”) designated the program at different times, while Melba was the code name for the first device. No more than ten people knew all the details of the program. It was never discussed in the cabinet or State Security Council. Even foreign minister Roelof F. Botha was not briefed until four years after he became a cabinet member. To further limit the chance of disclosure of program activities to the CIA, KGB, or press, severe limitations were placed on who could be hired. Physicists, chemists, and engineers had to either be South African citizens or have resided in the country for at least fifteen years.53

As the August 1977 incident demonstrated, there was always the threat of U.S. or Soviet satellites detecting nuclear weapons activities. To reduce the chances that imagery interpreters in Washington or Moscow would take an interest in the Kentron/Advena nuclear weapons facility, the building’s green roof was installed before construction of its internal walls or any significant equipment was sent to the site. Proposals to place sophisticated communications equipment on the roof were vetoed to avoid attracting attention. The precautions would prove successful, with its nuclear role remaining a secret until the South African government disclosed its function in March 1993. Another building, one closer to Valindaba, had become the focus of suspicion, a building that South African officials swore was never the scene of nuclear weapons work.54

The CIA, National Security Agency, and other U.S. intelligence agencies continued, of course, to gather whatever information they could on the South African program and make sense of the data collected. The interagency committee assigned to select targets for the National Reconnaissance Office’s imagery satellites continued to designate targets in South Africa. On May 11, 1982, a Keyhole satellite photographed the Simonstown Naval Base. The Kalahari test site, the Y-Plant, and other suspected nuclear facilities were likely photographed during that and other Keyhole missions during the decade.55

Communications intelligence coverage may have been conducted partially by geosynchronous satellites such as Rhyolite and Vortex along with the eavesdroppers of the CIA–NSA Special Collection Service working out of the U.S. embassy in Pretoria. The embassy was also home to a CIA station, whose officers were undoubtedly attempting to penetrate various components of the South African government.

Analysts also examined trade journals for evidence. Thus, Z Division analyst Frank Pabian became aware, probably shortly after it was published, of an item in Engineering Week, published in Johannesburg.

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