Spanish-Israeli Relations, 1956-1992 by Guy Setton

Author:Guy Setton [Setton, Guy]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Europe, Spain & Portugal, Political Science, International Relations, General
ISBN: 9781845197568
Google: VL7OsgEACAAJ
Publisher: Sussex Academic Press
Published: 2016-01-15T03:02:38+00:00

THE MOST PREDICTABLE SURPRISE

The greatest challenge was the Spanish demand for secrecy. The specific date on which relations were to be established had to be kept a secret. Felipe González was particularly concerned about the never-ending leaks to the press. The Prime Minister did not want to be portrayed on the domestic and international stage as being weak and having been pressured into establishing ties with Israel. In late 1985 he apparently declared in total frustration that he would only decide on the establishment of diplomatic relations once the press stopped writing about it.138

The Spanish and Israelis feared that an early announcement of the date for the establishment of relations would provide those opposing the move with further incentive to obstruct the inevitable even more.139 In late 1985, a Spanish lobby was established to oppose the normalization of ties with Israel in solidarity with the Arab world, specifically the Palestinians. It focused on communicating to the Spanish media their opposition to any rapprochement with Israel.140 They managed in January 1986 to publish a petition in El País signed by 100 people, mostly members of Spain’s Communist party, opposed to upgrading relations with Israel.141 Felipe González understood that he had to advance with maximum precaution and in absolute secrecy. Therefore, the final coordination between both countries was managed almost exclusively by representatives of González (Julio Feo and Juan Antonio Yañez) and Shimon Peres (MK Micha Harish and Uri Savir) to minimize the chances for any leaks to the press.

Not only were these last-minute coordination talks kept a secret for fear that any leak could delay the outcome but also because their premature public exposure could spoil the reward for success. Peres was keen on keeping the final date a secret for as long as possible to maximize the credit that he could collect if relations with Spain were established during his term as Prime Minister. He wanted to share as little credit as possible with Shamir being his Foreign Minister and political rival.142 The last thing Peres wanted was for the process to be delayed beyond September 1986. By then relations with Madrid would be established under Shamir’s premiership as per the national unity government agreement.

Diplomats from both sides needed to finalize the fine details, specifically the text for the joint declaration. On 9 January 1986 a secret meeting was held in Madrid between the delegations. The MFA was represented by Anug and Hadas, while the Palace of Santa Cruz was represented by Jorge Dezcallar, the Director General for the Middle East. For security reasons there was no advance announcement of the location and date for the formal gathering: The Hague on 17 January 1986.143 Felipe González apparently obtained a guarantee from the Israelis that there would be no military retaliation beforehand against the Abu Nidal Organization, or other Palestinian terrorist groups, following the attacks against the El Al check-in counters at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27.144 He wanted to ensure that the “opportune moment” would not vanish again.

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