Sharing and Hiding Religious Knowledge in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam by Mladen Popović Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta Clare Wilde

Sharing and Hiding Religious Knowledge in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam by Mladen Popović Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta Clare Wilde

Author:Mladen Popović, Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta, Clare Wilde
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: De Gruyter
Published: 2018-08-20T16:00:00+00:00


7.2 The Sign of Socrates

Socrates’s “sign” (σημεῖον) is mentioned in Plato’s dialogues describing the last days of Socrates, but continues to feature throughout the other dialogues. It is often called Socrates’s “daimonion” (δαιμόνιον), and sometimes the “voice” (φωνή) which occurs to him. In the Euthyphro, Socrates’s reference to his daimonion is taken as the reason why Socrates was charged with introducing new daimonia. When Socrates tells Euthyphro that Meletus of Pitthus has indicted him for making and introducing new gods, at the expense of the old gods, Euthyphro immediately links this charge with Socrates’s frequent mentioning of his own daimonion:

SOCRATES … he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says.

EUTHYPHRO I understand, Socrates; it is because you say the daimonion keeps coming to you (ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῂς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι). So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion … (Plato, Euthyphro 3B)

In his defence against these charges in the Apology, Socrates is said to confirm this link, as he explicitly says that Meletus, in his indictment, is targeting his frequent reference to his daimonion, the possession of which, Socrates tells the court, prohibits him from engaging in politics but lets him interact with people’s private lives:

Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people’s affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment (τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο). I have had this from my childhood (ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον); it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward (ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε). This it is which opposes my engaging in politics. (Plato, Apology 31D)

Hence, according to Plato there is indeed a direct connection between Socrates’s claim to possess a specific daimonion and the charges against him for introducing “new daimonia (δαιμόνια καινά)” (Apology 24B–C, 26B; cf. Euthyphro 3B), a view shared by Xenophon (see his Memorabilia 1.1.1–4). The charge of having introduced new daimonia is levelled against Socrates’s frequent references to his own daimonion. According to Plato, Socrates had repeatedly drawn the Athenians’ attention to this daimonion, “at many times and places.” And the nature of this daimonion is “apotreptic,” not “protreptic”: it holds him back (ἀποτρέπει) from what he is thinking of doing, but never urges him forward (προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε).



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