Rickover by Francis Duncan

Author:Francis Duncan
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Biographies & Memoirs
Published: 2021-06-17T00:00:00+00:00

The table in the commission’s 1960 annual report showed one important fact. Congress had authorized eleven submarines in addition to those in operation or under construction; in contrast, no more nuclear surface ships had been authorized since the Bainbridge in the 1959 building program.

One reason was expense. In January 1960 Burke sent an ad hoc committee under Rear Adm. Miles H. Hubbard to the yards where the three surface ships were under construction to investigate the causes of the escalating costs. On 25 February the committee issued its report. In every area building costs were going up. The costs of the Enterprise and Bainbridge had increased 1.5 times over their original estimates, and, because of exceptional circumstances, the costs for the Long Beach had grown 3.7 times. The increase for the nuclear propulsion plants of all three ships was 1.5 times, not out of line with the general trend.

The report came down hard on nuclear propulsion, declaring that no more nuclear surface ships should be built until those under construction had been tested at sea. It saw little chance that the pressurized water reactors would ever become competitive with oil-fueled propulsion plants. The technology cost too much, and pressurized water propulsion systems were too heavy for the horsepower they produced. It was far better to spend funds on improving the antiaircraft and antisubmarine capabilities of surface ships.265 Whatever influence it had, the report reflected an attitude, if not necessarily the reasoning, that was widespread among senior officers of the surface Navy.

With nuclear propulsion for surface ships a contentious issue, Burke thought a treatise covering the subject from all angles, good and bad, would provide a common source for Navy statements, speeches, articles, and testimony. Milton Shaw, Rickover’s surface ship project officer, worked closely with the office of the chief of naval operations on the paper.

“A Treatise on Nuclear Propulsion for Surface Ships” was completed in early 1961. In summary, the treatise acknowledged that nuclear propulsion would not have the same impact on surface ship operations as it did on those of submarines. Rough estimates, based on the best data available, indicated that nuclear surface ships could cost about one and a half times more than their oil-fired counterparts. Consequently, the Navy could buy three conventionally fueled frigates for the cost of two nuclear frigates. But nuclear propulsion could give surface ships virtually unlimited endurance at high average speed; they did not have to depend on tankers, themselves valuable and vulnerable targets, for fuel.266

Coming years would see the arguments become more elaborate and sophisticated, but the basic question was always the same: Were the military advantages that nuclear propulsion gave to surface ships worth their cost? The newly elected administration of John F. Kennedy would have to deal with the matter.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.