Rethinking Camelot: Jfk, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture by Noam Chomsky

Author:Noam Chomsky
Language: eng
Format: azw3, mobi, epub
Tags: United States, Non-Fiction, History, Politics
ISBN: 9781608464456
Publisher: Haymarket Books
Published: 1993-04-11T14:00:00+00:00

8. The Presidential Transition

At the Honolulu meeting of November 20, a draft was prepared (signed by McGeorge Bundy) for what became NSAM 273, adopted after the assassination but intended for JFK with the expectation that he would approve it in essentials, as was the norm. Top advisers agreed; Hilsman made only “minor changes.” The State Department history states that the draft “was almost identical to the final paper,” differing only in paragraph 7.

NSAM 273 was declassified in May 1978; the November 20 draft, on January 31, 1991. The draft is not published in the State Department history, but its assessment is quite accurate. Both documents reiterate the basic wording of the early October documents, and call for maintaining military and economic assistance at least at previous levels. On withdrawal, the NSAM approved by Johnson is identical with the draft prepared for Kennedy. It reads: “The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963,” referring to the statement of US policy at the NSC meeting, formalized without essential change as NSAM 263. As for paragraph 7, the draft and final version are, respectively, as follows:

Draft: With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action.

NSAM 273: Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:

A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;

B. The plausibility of denial;

C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;

D. Other international reaction.

Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.

(Action: State, DOD, and CIA)

The final phrase is attached to other paragraphs.66

There is no relevant difference between the two documents, except that the LBJ version is weaker and more evasive, dropping the call for “a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action”; further actions are reduced to “possible.” The reason why paragraph 7 refers to “additional” or “possible increased” activity we have already seen: such operations had been underway since the Kennedy offensive of 1962, apparently with direct participation of US personnel and foreign mercenaries.

As reviewed earlier, the military had advocated in January 1963 that operations against the North be continued (perhaps intensified) as a counterpart to the plans of the hawks for withdrawal after victory, with the agreement of Hilsman and reportedly the President. No direct US government involvement is proposed in NSAM 273 beyond what was already underway under JFK. Subsequent plans developed by the DOD and CIA call for “Intensified sabotage operations in North Vietnam by Vietnamese personnel,” with the US involved only in intelligence collection (U-2, electronics) and “psychological operations” (leaflet drops, “phantom covert operations,” “black and white radio broadcasts”).67

These two NSAMs (263 in October, 273 on November 26 with a November 20 draft written for

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