Reconceptualizing Deterrence by Lieberman Elli;

Author:Lieberman, Elli;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group

Regime influences and learning by challenger and defender

Sadat continued Nasser's changes in the military. He reaffirmed Nasser's decree to promote officers based on merit and not political loyalty. He appointed competent commanders to senior positions; and, not having to deal with serious political rivals, he developed a coherent military–political plan. First, he asked General Isma'il Ali to come back from retirement to head a team that would run Egypt's intelligence efforts against Israel and would plan Egypt's military's rebuilding. In 1972, he appointed Ali war minister, replacing Muhammad Ahmed Sadiq who intervened in politics. He also established a direct line of command through Ali to his military chief of staff, Lt. General Sa'd ad-Din Shazli, to prevent the recurrence of the problems Egypt encountered in 1967 with Amer.53

Based on his assessments of Egyptian and Israeli weaknesses and strengths, Sadat tailored the military operations to his belief about Egyptian capabilities. He realized Egypt could only plan for limited operations. Thus, the goal was to cross the Suez and capture a small bridgehead on the east bank. While plans were made for additional stages, such as the capturing of the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes, and then the rest of the Sinai, most planning focused on the first stage. The plan was called High Minarets and was planned meticulously to the last detail. Contingency plans, equipment, training, and secrecy were all used very carefully to accomplish the mission. The other stages were outlined vaguely, but no one trained on how to execute them.54

In addition to the limited goals, Egypt decided to use a surprise attack to offset Israel's superior capability once its forces were fully mobilized. This also would force the Israelis to fight defensive battles and not the offensive ones at which they excelled. After the crossing, Egypt would fight a defensive war that suited her capabilities better. The initial offensive would not rely on maneuver and speed, which were not Egypt's strengths, but on attrition, in which Egypt had the advantage in terms of manpower and material. To deal with Egypt's weakness in combined arms, initiative, and improvisation at the tactical level, the Egyptian command planned the whole operation to the last detail and trained every soldier on his exact mission. The entire operation was rehearsed 35 times before the attack.55

The military was rebuilt and reorganized to correct previous weaknesses. To improve tactical leadership, Egypt recruited college students and university graduates. By 1973 half the armed forces were engineers, and the officer training included adaptability, improvisation, and independent action. Accurate reporting also was encouraged. To improve morale, the split between officers and enlisted men was narrowed by changes in recruiting patterns; Egypt began to recruit from the urban middle and upper classes. Officers were held to higher standards and were forced to train with their soldiers, as well as spend more time with them. And many in the Egyptian army were trained to focus on accomplishing the mission regardless of the higher costs. The Egyptian high command knew that in

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