On War by Carl von Clausewitz & Michael Eliot Howard & Peter Paret

On War by Carl von Clausewitz & Michael Eliot Howard & Peter Paret

Author:Carl von Clausewitz & Michael Eliot Howard & Peter Paret [Clausewitz, Carl von]
Language: eng
Format: mobi
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 1989-05-31T22:00:00+00:00


The simplest and most outstanding example would be the case in which the defender is able to leave one or more fortresses behind, which the attacker must invest or besiege. It is obvious that this will weaken his forces and provide an opportunity for an attack by the defender at a point where he has the upper hand.

Even where there are no fortresses, such a retreat to the interior can gradually restore to the defender the balance or superiority that he did not have on the frontier. In a strategic attack, every advance reduces the attacker’s strength, partly as an absolute loss and partly because of the division of forces which becomes necessary. We shall discuss this in greater detail in connection with the attack. For the present, we shall simply assume this statement to be correct, since it has been sufficiently demonstrated in past wars.

The main advantage of this fourth case lies in the time that is gained. If the enemy lays siege to our fortresses, we have gained time until their surrender (which is probable, but which may take several weeks, and in some cases months). If, on the other hand, his loss of strength, the exhaustion of the momentum of his attack, is caused simply by his advance and by having to leave garrisons at vital points, and thus only by the distance he has covered, the amount of time gained will usually be even greater and we are not so strongly compelled to act at any given moment.

Not only will the relative strength of defender and attacker have changed when this action has run its course, the former will also have to his credit the increased benefit of waiting. Even if the attacker has not been weakened enough by his advance to prevent him from attacking our main force where it has come to rest, he may lack the determination to do so. This determination must be stronger here than it would have had to be at the frontier: the reason is partly that his forces are reduced and no longer fresh while his danger has increased, and partly that irresolute commanders will completely forget about the necessity of a battle once possession of the area has been achieved; either because they really think it is no longer necessary, or because they are glad of the pretext. Their failure to attack is not, of course, the adequate negative success for the defender that it would have been on the frontier, but the time gained is substantial nonetheless.

In all four cases cited, it goes without saying that the defender has the benefit of terrain, and that the support of his fortresses and the populace are favorable to his action. With each successive stage of defense these elements become more significant, and in the fourth stage they are particularly effective in weakening the enemy. Since the advantages of waiting also increase with each phase, it follows that each successive stage of defense is more effective than the last, and that this form of warfare gains in effectiveness the further it is removed from attack.



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