On Inequality by Harry G. Frankfurt

Author:Harry G. Frankfurt [Frankfurt, Harry G.]
Language: eng
Format: epub, mobi
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

two

equality and respect

1. I propose to deal further, in this section of my book, with issues that pertain to the alleged moral value of equality. So far as I am aware, nothing I shall say concerning these issues implies anything of substance as to the kinds of social or political policies it may be desirable to pursue or to avoid. My discussion is motivated exclusively by conceptual or analytic interests. It is not inspired or shaped by any social or political ideology.

2. I categorically reject the presumption that egalitarianism, of whatever variety, is an ideal of any intrinsic moral importance. This emphatically does not mean that I am inclined generally to endorse or to be indifferent to prevailing inequalities, or that I oppose efforts to eliminate or to ameliorate them. In fact, I support many such efforts. What leads me to support them, however, is not a conviction that equality of some kind is morally desirable for its own sake and that certain egalitarian goals are therefore inherently worthy. Rather, it is a more contingent and pragmatically grounded belief that in many circumstances greater equality of one sort or another would facilitate the pursuit of other socially or politically desirable aims. I am convinced that equality as such has no inherent or underived moral value at all.1

3. Some philosophers believe that an equal distribution of certain valuable resources, just by virtue of being egalitarian, is a significant moral good. Others maintain that what actually is of moral importance is not that the resources be distributed equally but that every one enjoy the same level of welfare. All of these philosophers agree that there is some type of equality that is morally valuable in itself, quite apart from whatever utility it may possess in supporting efforts to achieve other morally desirable goals.

It seems to me that insofar as egalitarian ideals are based on the supposition that equality of some kind is morally desirable as such, or for its own sake, the moral appeal of economic egalitarianism is an illusion. It is true that, among morally conscientious individuals, appeals in behalf of equality often have very considerable emotional or rhetorical power. Moreover, as I have indicated, there are situations in which morally pertinent considerations do indeed dictate that a certain inequality should be avoided or reduced. Nevertheless, I believe that it is always a mistake to regard equality of any kind as desirable inherently. There is no egalitarian ideal the realization of which is valuable simply and strictly in its own right. Whenever it is morally important to strive for equality, it is always because doing so will promote some other value rather than because equality itself is morally desirable.

In addition to equality of resources and equality of welfare, several other modes of equality may be distinguished: equality of opportunity, equal respect, equal rights, equal consideration, equal concern, and so on. My view is that none of these modes of equality is intrinsically valuable. Hence I maintain that none of the egalitarian ideals corresponding to them has any underived moral worth.

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