North Korea and Nuclear Weapons by Kim Sung Chull; Cohen Michael D.; & Michael D. Cohen

Author:Kim, Sung Chull; Cohen, Michael D.; & Michael D. Cohen
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781626164543
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
Published: 2017-01-15T00:00:00+00:00

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR THREAT AND SOUTH KOREA’S DETERRENCE STRATEGY

Chaesung Chun

ON JANUARY 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and claimed that the regime had succeeded in developing hydrogen bombs. On September 9, the North conducted its fifth test, claiming that it was the successful test of a bomb enabling it to produce a variety of smaller, lighter, and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power. These tests were followed by a test of a long-range missile engine, which the North claims to be a new, high-powered type for launching a geostationary satellite. Pyongyang has explicitly stated that its purpose is to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach US territory. It is improbable that North Korea will slow down its nuclear buildup and even more improbable that the North will give up its nuclear programs. North Korea argues that the motive in going nuclear is to deter a US nuclear first strike, but this is highly unpersuasive.1 With an enhanced second-strike ability to attack the American mainland, North Korea would like to negotiate with Washington and Seoul to get the most profitable outcome from a perceived position of strength. The regime might also think of using nuclear weapons if Kim Jong-un’s power is under serious challenge.

There is no doubt that deterrence will be the foundation for stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, unlike many ongoing interstate rivalries, a status quo or stability between the two based on the military balance is not a sustainable equilibrium. Korea is a divided country, and two Koreas are officially at war because the Korean War ended by armistice, not a peace treaty, in 1953. Peace between the two Koreas is obviously a desirable condition, but as the two Koreas both hope to reunify the Korean Peninsula on their own terms, stability or negative peace—meaning merely the absence of war—is not the ultimate goal. Although North Korea can be successfully deterred for the time being, North Korea, being aware of its weak position in the competition with South Korea, will continue to rely on military means and especially nuclear weapons. South Korea’s strategy of deterrence is therefore only a part of South Korea’s North Korea policy in a broader sense. Deterrence itself is not a purpose but only a basis from which the two Koreas can start negotiations for denuclearization, reconciliation, and ultimately reunification. South Korea has tried to combine the two pillars of deterrence and sanctions to develop a balance of power upon which they can negotiate future reconciliation and engagement with the North.

This chapter will examine North Korea’s efforts to enhance nuclear capability and South Korea’s deterrence strategy. It will critically review deterrence theory and explore whether it will be applicable in devising deterrence strategy to deal with the totalitarian North.

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