Nato--The Next Generation by Robert E. Hunter

Author:Robert E. Hunter [Hunter, Robert E.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367155759
Google: cYX3ygEACAAJ
Goodreads: 48633628
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2020-12-07T00:00:00+00:00

Will the United States Shift its Priority on NATO Defense?

Indeed, one has the impression that our European allies do not yet fully recognize the extent to which U.S. security policy and, equally important, programs are tending to shift away from the traditional priority accorded to NATO defense. In part this shift reflects sheer frustration over heightened U.S.-European differences, in part a perception that Europe is not pulling its share of the load, and in part the prominence of more immediate security challenges outside Europe. Until recently the United States saw its defense of Europe as the primary mission of U.S. conventional forces and the extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe as a nuclear mission second only to the defense of the United States itself. Notwithstanding two major conflicts with Soviet surrogates in Asia, U.S. planning always gave primacy to NATO defense. But these priorities are finally changing.

First, what is perceived in Washington as a growing threat of Soviet or surrogate expansionism in volatile Third World areas, as exemplified by Afghanistan, has led many to question whether the United States should invest so much in NATO defense at the expense of meeting these other interests. In general, the United States sees Third World conflict affecting U.S. interests as much more likely to occur than overt Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO. The most important case in point is potential Soviet denial of Free World oil access to the Persian Gulf, which has already led to signficant diversions of U.S. defense resources from NATO commitments. Understandably, the United States regards itself as protecting European (and Japanese) as much as U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, but it discerns no comparable allied concern. Another case in point is the new U.S. focus on feared Soviet and surrogate exploitation of socioeconomic unrest in the Caribbean Basin.

Allied to this is the belief in the United States that Europe can do more to defend itself than it is willing to undertake, or that conventional defense of Europe is too difficult given the proximity of overwhelming Soviet land power in Eurasia. Why should the United States invest more in defending Europe than Europe is willing to invest itself?

These and other factors, such as the strong influence of ardent navalists in the Reagan administration, have led to increasing debate between the advocates of what might be called a "maritime strategy" and those they deride as Atlanticist or orthodox adherents of a more balanced force posture and strategy aimed at preserving vital U.S. interests in Europe and the Persian Gulf. Both are schools of conventional strategy, although neither proposes to abandon nuclear deterrence. Both favor a "forward strategy" based on strong U.S. force projection capabilities, though they strongly disagree over whether the United States should settle for a sea-control navy or build one designed primarily for offensive maritime force projection into high threat areas. Tacitly acknowledging Soviet conventional predominance on the Eurasian land mass, and stressing instead U.S. exploitation of the medium it can most readily dominate—the sea—the navalist school advocates allocating the bulk of U.

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