Migration and Democracy by Abel Escrib-Folch;Joseph Wright;Covadonga Meseguer;

Author:Abel Escrib-Folch;Joseph Wright;Covadonga Meseguer;
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2021-11-03T00:00:00+00:00

5.2.2.  Remittances, Poverty, and Turnout

This section explores how poverty shapes the relationship between remittances and turnout at the individual level. Prior sections show that remittances decrease turnout in swing districts. We argue that this finding is consistent with a disengagement theory of election turnout, whereby ruling parties aim turnout-buying schemes at would-be supporters in swing districts. When remittances reduce turnout in swing districts, this undermines the clientelistic stategy of ruling parties to mobilize support that is central to electoral authoritarianism. However, if this theory is correct, we should also expect the marginal effect of additional private income via remittances to be largest among citizens who have low initial income levels from non-remittance sources: those, that is, who are relatively poor. Thus, if remittances decrease turnout in swing districts, this effect should be stronger for high-poverty than for low-poverty respondents.

Recall from the last chapter that poverty is measured as an ordinal variable that captures access to basic goods, such as food, water, medical care, and housing. To examine whether the remittance effect in swing districts is concentrated among the poorest respondents, we test a model that allows for the marginal effect of remittances to vary across the five values of the individual-level poverty index. We then conduct this test for both swing districts (i.e., those with between 50 and 75 percent government support) and non-swing districts (those outside this range). Figure 5.4 shows the results. The horizontal axis depicts five levels of individual poverty, from 0 to 1. For each level of poverty, the plot shows the marginal effect of remittance receipt on turnout—for both swing districts (in black) and non-swing districts (in gray). In swing districts, the estimates at the lower poverty levels (i.e., among higher-consumption respondents) are negative but relatively small ( to percent) and not statistically significant. For the highest two levels of poverty in swing districts, however, the estimates are large, negative, and statistically significant—at around 6 percent. In non-swing districts, none of the estimates is statistically different from zero, and they form no obvious pattern along the poverty index. This suggests that if remittance receipt lowers turnout in swing districts, this effect is strongest among higher-poverty respondents. This finding is consistent with a turnout-buying theory whereby ruling parties concentrate clientelism in swing districts and target lower income voters.

FIGURE 5.4. Remittances and vote turnout, by poverty level

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