Managing the Military by Sharon K. Weiner

Author:Sharon K. Weiner
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Columbia University Press

TRANSFORMATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Rumsfeld’s two attempts at transformation show the limits of civilian control. Rumsfeld arrived in the Pentagon with the full backing of President George W. Bush for his transformation agenda and lacking any inclination to be timid in asserting what he considered appropriate civilian control of the Pentagon. The president’s support was subsequently reiterated in the fall of 2001 and the spring of 2002 when Rumsfeld established the Office of Force Transformation. Moreover, success in Afghanistan and Iraq seemed, at least initially, to validate Rumsfeld’s argument about a smaller, more flexible mobile force.

Yet after five budgets and two QDRs, most of the service’s favored weapons remained. The battles Rumsfeld won, such as those concerning increased funding for missile defense and drones, were due to budget increases and supplements, not cuts to service priorities. The one exception was the army, which lost the Crusader, Comanche, and eventually the Future Combat System. But, with the exception of the Crusader, the army supported canceling or restructuring these platforms. Moreover, Rumsfeld failed to reduce the size of the army. The active-duty army was at 481,000 members when Rumsfeld arrived at the Pentagon. It was 482,000 when he left in 2006.68

Certainly, part of the failure of transformation lies with Rumsfeld’s management style. His dismissive and authoritarian tactics annoyed not only the service chiefs, but many of the career people working in the Pentagon. The service chiefs distrusted Rumsfeld and felt he was dismissive of their expertise. They were not about to unquestioningly follow his direction to eliminate many of their long-standing investment priorities.

Congress did not offer a counterweight to the unified opposition of the service chiefs. Not only did the services’ weapon preferences have congressional supporters, but Rumsfeld also gained more enemies when he proposed significant cuts to one of the mainstays of congressional pork: military construction projects. Some Republicans disliked him because they felt defense budgets were too low. Democrats opposed the administration in general, and especially after questions about the war in Iraq mounted. Even when the 2002 midterm elections returned control of both houses to the Republicans, Rumsfeld’s support in Congress was meager.

The chairman played a minor role in the failure of transformation. Even if Shelton had supported Rumsfeld’s agenda, in the face of opposition from the service chiefs and with only a few allies in Congress, even a politically savvy military officer would have faced an uphill battle. But Shelton’s and Myers’s roles do provide important clues about the changed nature of civil-military relations. Like Powell before him, Shelton’s experience makes it clear that the chairman can successfully stake out a position independent of and in contradiction to the defense secretary. Moreover, early in his tenure Shelton asserted his right to provide advice to the president independent of the secretary. In his autobiography, Shelton recounts an early exchange with the Rumsfeld:

Finally he [Rumsfeld] asked me, “How do you view your job?”

That was easy because it’s specifically delineated by federal statute. “Mr. Secretary, I am the principal military adviser to

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