Magnificent Delusions by Husain Haqqani

Author:Husain Haqqani [Haqqani, Husain]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781610393188
Publisher: PublicAffairs

WHEN INDIA ANNOUNCED on May 18, 1974, that it had tested a “peaceful nuclear device,” Americans were preoccupied with controversies related to the Watergate scandal. Although the timing of the test may have been a shock, the United States had been tracking India’s nuclear program for a while. Soon after the Bangladesh war, in February 1972, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) had sought the CIA’s opinion on the possibility of an Indian nuclear test.

The INR director, Ray Cline, had written in a report forwarded to CIA Director Richard Helms that “India probably has undertaken research directly related to the development of nuclear weapons, and may well have fabricated one or more nuclear devices.”54 India apparently had fifty to sixty kilograms of plutonium at the time, produced in its Canadian-Indian Reactor, US (CIRUS) facility at Trombay. This would serve as fissionable material for devices, which the Indian government wanted to test as peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs).

The United States and Canada had assisted India in building the CIRUS reactor, and India’s agreements with both countries restricted it to peaceful purposes. But the agreements did not provide for inspection or verification procedures to determine the uses for CIRUS-produced plutonium. Moreover, Cline pointed out, the language of the agreements did not specifically preclude “peaceful” nuclear explosions. India had not accepted US and Canadian interpretations of these agreements as precluding all nuclear explosions on the grounds. In the North American reading, any such explosion would be identical to a nuclear weapons test.

“Regarding the prospects of an Indian decision to proceed with a nuclear test,” Cline had stated that in his judgment, “such a decision is unlikely during the next few months and may well be deferred for several years. The political and economic restraints would appear—in the near term—to outweigh the international political or military benefits which could flow from becoming the world’s sixth nuclear power.”55

His assessment was based on the fact that India still lacked a viable delivery system for nuclear weapons. A nuclear test conducted several years before having the means to deliver an atomic bomb would be of “very limited military value.” Although the tests might confer a new status on India and “the immediate reaction of the Indian populace could be quite favorable,” Cline observed, the long-term costs could be very high. India would have to divert resources from critical domestic programs and could lose foreign technical assistance.

The US intelligence community had precise information on India’s capabilities in producing plutonium as well as about the facilities where it was produced. It also knew that several aircraft in the Indian Air Force could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons. According to Cline, these included Canberra light jet bombers as well as Mystere IV, Hunter, SU-7 FITTER, and MIG-21 FISHBED fighters. But he anticipated that “the Indians would have some difficulty developing a nuclear weapon suitable for delivery by the fighter aircraft.”

The B-57 Canberra, for example, had a four thousand-pound payload. It could carry a nuclear bomb, but it did not possess “sufficient range capabilities to constitute a strategic threat to China.

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