Jihadism Constrained by Mendelsohn Barak;

Author:Mendelsohn, Barak;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781538118498
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated

STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES

Disagreements over strategy are perhaps the most obvious hindrance for unity among jihadis, transnational or locally focused. Such disagreements could derail collective action among jihadis. Although jihadis repeatedly declare that their struggle is part of an eternal fight between the forces of truth (the jihadis) and the forces of falsehood (the “Jewish-Crusader alliance” and the “apostate regimes”)12—what Mark Juergensmeyer calls a “cosmic war”13—the long-time horizons such a view involves failed to prevent jihadis from arguing over immediate issues such as the choice of a strategy. On the face of it, the enormity of the jihadi enterprise, the power of their sworn enemies, and jihadis’ belief in God’s promise of an eventual victory, all should have allowed jihadis to smooth over their strategic differences and postpone a self-defeating conflict. But especially after the emergence of the Islamic State and its push to establish a caliphate, it has become evident that many jihadis expect to see quicker results, therefore making their disagreements more urgent. The friction created when transnational jihadis operate in the same arena as local jihadis also brings intra-jihadi clashes over strategy.

Heated debates over strategic priorities could be observed as early as the end of the 1980s. With the war against the Soviets winding down, Arab-Afghans bitterly argued about the future of the jihadi movement. Reluctant to let the spirit of jihad fade away and see the emergent jihadi movement—that for the first time brought together jihadis and jihadi groups from all over the world—disintegrate, the multitude of jihadi actors contemplated their next moves. At first, two main ideas dominated jihadi plans for the post-Afghanistan era. Abdallah Azzam advocated for continued fight in defense of Muslims who came under attack by non-Muslim nations. By contrast, members of state-based jihadi groups pushed to focus on toppling the “near enemy”—the regimes ruling their home countries. These two paths coexisted throughout much of the decade as jihadis brought their fight back to their home countries of Egypt, Algeria, and Libya, while others joined jihad arenas in Bosnia, Kashmir, and Chechnya.

As the two options resulted in disappointing results, a third option, emphasizing the U.S. as the primary target began taking hold. In the early 1990s, bin Laden was still not strongly attached to any one direction. He was supportive of both efforts to fight foreign “occupiers” and “apostate” regimes. However, after the Saudi regime rejected his offer to use veterans of the war in Afghanistan to protect Saudi Arabia from a potential Iraqi attack, and instead invited American forces, bin Laden was outraged.14 Already hostile to the U.S., this episode led bin Laden to advocate a third path for jihad that emphasized fighting the world’s sole remaining superpower. Bin Laden’s strategic analysis, which emphasized attacking the American “far enemy” in order to facilitate a confrontation with the “near enemy” in a later stage, was discussed in the previous chapter. Bin Laden’s analysis was controversial. Far from uniting all jihadi groups behind his America-first strategy, bin Laden found that many within the movement rejected his actions.

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