Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999-2001 by Gilead Sher

Author:Gilead Sher [Sher, Gilead]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Middle East, General, Political Science, Social Science, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9781135319625
Google: dVT5AQAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2013-11-05T16:00:09+00:00

14

TWO STATES FOR TWO PEOPLES

President Clinton and Mubarak were very interested in promoting a formula for the Temple Mount in the hope of moving quickly forward toward concluding the package. The precondition was an agreement on Jerusalem. A small summit was considered for the following week in New York. The American effort focused on convening a full summit – for conclusion and signature – by November 15. From now on, each of the sides would work with the Americans. The problem with this format was that the positions of the sides would harden. Each side knew that it must present a position that the “fair mediator” would have to “wear down” even before it was presented to the other side. Moreover, if negotiations were to suddenly stop, each side would want the remaining documentation to leave as much room as possible for future flexibility with the resumption of negotiations.

The negotiation meetings on August 30 and 31 were dedicated to drafting the introduction and articles 1 (the purpose of the framework agreement) and 2 (relations between states). Erekat proposed that the Palestinian wording “financial claims for the occupation” would be replaced by “Israeli civilian aid to promote good neighborly relations.” Erekat and I read to each other the paragraphs on the issues of territory, settlements and borders. We were guided by the mutual interest of formulating logical, practical solutions, and expressing fairness both in territorial and security arrangements.

While the Israeli text on Jerusalem met with a few reservations, the Palestinian text reflected a rigid, dogmatic position that was substantially backward relative to the progress we had made in the discussions. The Palestinians focused on the concept of an “open city” – a theoretical model which had no practical possibility of being implemented. It was a bleak meeting. We had no idea how to reconcile the contradictions between the positions of the sides on the issue of Jerusalem in general, and on the Temple Mount in particular. Saeb proposed that I meet with Abu Mazen and discuss with him the Beilin-Abu Mazen Understandings. I agreed, wondering why the Palestinians were not willing to accept the chapter on security from the 1995 document, as a basis for continued negotiations. There was no answer.

The discussions continued intensively in the days prior to the prime minister’s trip to the UN General Assembly in New York. The Palestinians were trying to create a link between the end of conflict and the implementation of the agreement. In relation to the finality of claims, they demanded to detail the full list of claims in both the framework and comprehensive agreement, most likely because of their intention to file claims compensating them for the occupation. This outrageous intention, which is a bold-faced contradiction of good faith negotiations toward peace, first came up in a casual conversation with Erekat at Camp David. One could describe the process we were experiencing as a conveyor belt, in which a fine product comes out of the manufacturing line, only to be damaged and destroyed by someone time and time again.

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