Intelligence Failure In Korea: by Major Justin M. Haynes

Author:Major Justin M. Haynes [Haynes, Major Justin M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, Korean War, Asia, India & South Asia, Korea, Central Asia
ISBN: 9781786253897
Google: rsFvCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2015-11-06T05:07:51+00:00

Figure 10. Key Leaders at Wake Island

Source: James F. Schnabel, The United States Army in The Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1972), 211.

The purpose of the Wake Conference was to develop a common vision of United States strategy in Korea as well as to discuss the potential for Chinese Communist entry into the War and to define the military end state.{194} Accompanying President Truman to the meeting were his most senior foreign policy and military advisors. Vernice Anderson{195} recalled that personnel traveling with the President saw the meeting as an extraordinary event. Traveling with Truman was General of the Army Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; Ambassador Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President; Secretary of the Army Pace; and Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.{196}

Willoughby accompanied MacArthur to Wake Island and participated in briefing Truman on the situation in Korea.{197} During this briefing, he and MacArthur told the President and his senior advisors of their assessment that the Chinese would not enter the Korean War. Secretary of the Army Pace specifically asked MacArthur if he was getting enough support from Washington. The general replied: “No commander in the history of war has ever had more complete and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than I have.”{198} Taking into account the Far East Command’s exclusion of outsiders and Willoughby’s tight control over intelligence operations, any additional analysis from Washington would have been unwelcome in MacArthur’s headquarters.

A common assumption that the Korean War was nearly over dominated the discussions between MacArthur and the senior officials from Washington. MacArthur expressed his ultimate intent to the President and General Bradley: “It is my hope to be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas.”{199} This mindset permeated discussions during the conference, which also focused on a pending peace treaty between the U.S. and Japan and the ramifications of U.S. troops re-deploying to Japan after the fighting in Korea was over. MacArthur warned Truman that a long term U.S. occupation of Korea would result in failure. He advocated rebuilding a Korean Army and supporting air and naval services in order to prevent Communist infringement. In this recommendation, he acknowledged the Chinese threat: “If we do that, it will not only secure Korea but it will be a tremendous deterrent to the Chinese Communists moving south. This is a threat that cannot be laughed off”{200} In this statement, MacArthur acknowledged the potential for Chinese intervention in Korea and the implications of its severity.

The Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Bradley, pushed to move experienced troops from Korea to Europe as soon as possible. Citing the difficulty in getting forces to Europe before spring, 1951, he requested, “Could the Second or Third Division be made available to be sent over to Europe by January?” MacArthur agreed, selecting the Second Infantry Division.{201} Word of this decision rapidly spread throughout the UN Command at the conclusion of the conference.

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