India-Pakistan Strategic Relations by Christoph Bluth

Author:Christoph Bluth [Uzma, Bluth, Christoph; Mumtaz,]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Ibidem Press
Published: 2020-03-19T16:00:00+00:00

4.5 The relationship between the nuclear and the conventional balance

In relation to the military confrontation in Central Europe during the Cold War period, the role of conventional forces and by implication the significance of the conventional balance and its relation to the nuclear balance in the overall equation of deterrence was subject to controversy and evolved over time. In the early phase of the Cold War, reliance by the United States on nuclear deterrence was inevitable due to the significant imbalance of conventional forces in Europe after the war and the virtual monopoly of nuclear air power. The articulation of the doctrine of massive retaliation confirmed the primacy of nuclear deterrence in US strategy. This was partly the result of the sheer cost of conventional rearmament and the increasing stockpile of nuclear weapons that could be used for tactical and strategic missions, as well as the development of thermonuclear weapons. Although the United States strongly pushed for the strengthening of conventional forces in Europe, the early use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict was part of a strategic approach to deterrence that was linked to the doctrine of containment that assumed that any outbreak of hostilities would be initiated by the Soviet Union. As Glen Snyder pointed out, nuclear weapons were focussed on deterrence by punishment, although later concepts of deterrence by denial became also part of the strategic vocabulary.34 Although conventional forces could also be in principle be used for purposes of deterrence, as Snyder argues this function was usually secondary and a consequence of the deployment of conventional forces capable to fulfil the function of defence. The failure of the NATO Allies to meet the force goals agreed at Lisbon resulted in the “New Look” proclaimed by President Eisenhower that envisaged the deployment of tactical weapons in Europe to compensate for the imbalance in conventional forces. This conflated the functions of deterrence (or in Snyder’s parlance the balance of terror) and defence by integrating nuclear weapons into the defence of European territory. It meant that nuclear weapons were likely to be used very early in any conflict as forward based artillery, strike aircraft and even air defence systems were equipped with nuclear warheads. The role of conventional weapons was that of a “shield” that would delay the advance of the enemy until the “sword” of nuclear weapons was ready to be employed.35

The problem with massive retaliation and the “New Look” was that the early use of nuclear weapons became less credible as the Soviet Union increasingly acquired a substantial capability to target the continental United States with nuclear weapons. If we follow Snyder’s analysis, this created a “disequilibrium” as there was increasingly a balance of nuclear forces, but an imbalance in conventional forces that was increasingly no longer compensated for by a significant advantage in nuclear forces favouring the US. This could give rise to what Snyder has called the “stability/instability” paradox. Stability at the strategic level exists between two powers if in the aftermath

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