India in the Indo-Pacific by Aditi Malhotra;

Author:Aditi Malhotra; [Aditi Malhotra]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783847418412
Publisher: Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH

Equally important is the understanding that China’s self-conception as a great power is aspirational. The Chinese government seeks to assume this role by 2049, the year that would mark a century of the founding of the PRC. According to Gareis (2017), the year 2049 holds considerable foreign policy implications for China. Previously, 2021 was an important year as the CCP marked its centenary. By 2021, China had hoped to finish building a “moderately prosperous society in all respects … and work tirelessly to realise the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” (Xinhua, 2017, para. 2). China aims to become an undisputed regional power and work towards the ultimate great power role, which it hopes to realise by 2049.

There are two very pertinent components of China’s grand strategy in the pursuit of the great power role: the ‘China Dream’ and the aim to be a “great maritime power”. The concept of the China Dream cropped up in Chinese discourse in November 2012 and is connected to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi Jinping quoted in Callahan, 2016, p. 3). Xi, in his first Presidential speech in 2013, remarked that to “fulfil the China Dream … we must achieve a rich and powerful country, the revitalisation of the nation, and the people’s happiness” (Xi Jinping as quoted in Callahan, 2016, p. 3). Although the general focus of the China Dream is on domestic politics, it is [185] equally applicable when examining external policies (Callahan, 2017). As noted by Gareis (2019, p. 89), the China Dream reflects the country’s aim to “bring back to its historical position of a leading power in world politics”.

Maritime power is a fundamental element of the great power role performance. During the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, the CCP officially introduced China’s long-term goal of becoming a great maritime power (haiyang qiangguo) (Embassy of the PRC in the USA, 2012; also see Bickford, 2016). In the language of role theory, this can be categorised as an auxiliary self-conception. Tobin (2018) notes that Xi connects the maritime strategy as a crucial element to achieving the 2049 objective of the China Dream. Beijing feels the need to achieve supremacy in all aspects of maritime power and to become a “modern maritime military force structure” to ensure the protection of its “national sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests” (Xinhua, 2015, para. 7).

Even the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—the world’s largest infrastructure program—is connected to President Xi’s China Dream. The BRI is an umbrella initiative of multimodal transport infrastructure and connectivity projects that stretches from Asia, Africa, and China to Europe. It has two parts—land-centric projects known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and a maritime component called the Maritime Silk Road (MSR).49 After the BRI became President Xi’s pet project in 2013, the CCP added a strategic angle to it. Through the BRI, China envisages greater involvement in the global economic, political, and maritime orders and seeks to offer a Sino-centric model of development to other countries.

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